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# bulletin

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## San Francisco Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Peace Treaty With Japan

### OPENING ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT TRUMAN<sup>1</sup>

I am glad to welcome you to this conference for signing the treaty of peace with Japan. The people of the United States are honored to serve as hosts for this meeting.

Six years ago, the nations represented at this conference were engaged in a bitter and costly war. Nevertheless, these nations and others came together here, in this very hall, to set up the United Nations as the first essential step toward a firm and lasting peace.

Today, we meet here again to take another step along the road to peace. On this occasion, it is our purpose to conclude a treaty of peace with a country we were fighting in 1945. We meet to restore our former enemy to the community of peaceful nations.

The treaty we are gathered here to sign has not been drawn in a spirit of revenge. The treaty reflects the spirit in which we carried on the war. The principles for which we fought were clearly set forth by President Franklin D. Roosevelt right after Pearl Harbor. On December 9, 1941, in a broadcast to the American people, he said:

"When we resort to force, as now we must, we are determined that this force shall be directed toward ultimate good as well as against immediate evil. . . . We are now in the midst of a war, not for conquest, not for vengeance, but for a world in which this nation, and all that this nation represents, will be safe for our children."

That is our purpose here today as we gather to sign the peace treaty. We are trying to build a world in which the children of all nations can live together in peace. We hope we are attaining the ultimate good to which President Roosevelt referred.

Unfortunately, today, the world is faced with new threats of aggression. Many of the countries represented here are now engaged in a hard fight to uphold the United Nations against international lawbreaking. But we have not forgotten that our

goal is peace. We will not let the present conflict deter us from taking every step we can toward peace. We will not let that happen now, any more than we let the existence of war in 1945 hold up our efforts for the United Nations.

The people of all our countries long for one thing above all else, and they are determined to have it. What they want is a world at peace—a world where there is justice and freedom for all men and all nations. Our peoples demand of us that we take every possible measure to reach that goal.

We who stand ready to sign this treaty with Japan believe in peace. We believe in peace based on freedom and international justice. We know that a free and independent people have more vigor and staying power and can do more to help secure the peace than a people held under alien control. We believe that the whole great effort for peace will be strengthened if Japan is now restored to independence and linked to other free nations by ties of mutual friendship and responsibility.

### Objective of Occupation Achieved

Since the fighting ended in 1945, Japan has been an occupied country. The occupation was designed by the wartime Allies to prevent future Japanese aggression and to establish Japan as a peaceful and democratic country, prepared to return to the family of nations. The United States, as the principal occupying power, was given a special responsibility to carry out these objectives. It is our judgment that they have been achieved. I wish on this occasion to express the pride that my countrymen and I feel in the way in which the Allied occupation has been carried out. Its success has been due to the devoted efforts of many thousands of people serving under the outstanding leadership of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur and his successor General Matthew Ridgway.

I would also like to pay tribute to the impressive effort put forward by the people of Japan in this period. They have fully complied with the surrender terms. They have cooperated fully in

<sup>1</sup> Made at the conference on the Japanese peace treaty at San Francisco, Calif., on Sept. 4 and released to the press by the White House on the same date.



carrying out the purposes of the occupation. The result has been a remarkable and unprecedented period of progress in Japanese history. Japan, today, is a very different country from what it was six years ago. The old militarism has been swept away. This has been done not just by occupation edict but by the overwhelming will of the Japanese people themselves. The secret police and the police-state methods used by the former government have been abolished.

The new Japanese constitution provides a bill of rights for all citizens and establishes a government truly representative of the people. The Japanese people now have universal suffrage, and they are taking a vigorous part in their government. In recent local elections, more than 90 percent of those eligible have voted. Japanese women now vote and take part in the government and enjoy full democratic rights for the first time. Free and independent labor unions have been established, and farm cooperatives have been greatly expanded. The monopolies that used to have such a stranglehold on the Japanese economy have been substantially broken up.

Remarkable progress has been made in land reform. Over 5 million acres of land have been purchased from the old landlords and sold to working farmers. Today, about 90 percent of all cultivated land belongs to those who work on it, as compared with less than 50 percent in 1945. This is a great achievement, full of meaning for all Asia.

Through these and other reforms, the Japanese people have been developing a stable economy and a democratic society. They still have a long way to go, but they are well on the road to building a new Japan—dedicated to the arts of peace and the well-being of the people. Because of these accomplishments, it is possible at this time to restore full sovereignty to the Japanese people.

This does not mean that the slate has been wiped clean. The United States has not forgotten Pearl Harbor or Bataan, and many of the other nations represented here have similar memories that will not easily be erased. The new Japan will not find the world entirely friendly and trusting. It will have to keep on working to win the friendship and trust of other peoples over the years to come. But the foundations for a peaceful future have been laid. It is now time to move ahead with the restoration of normal relations between Japan and the rest of the world.

#### **Treaty Constructed by Cooperative Effort**

This conference is the result of a year of cooperative effort toward that end. A year ago this month, at my request, Mr. John Foster Dulles began to consult other governments about a treaty of peace with Japan. Mr. Dulles has performed this task faithfully and well, guided by the highest traditions of statesmanship.

There were, of course, differences of opinion among the nations concerned as to many of the matters covered by this treaty. The text of the treaty now before us is the product of long and patient negotiations, among many nations, which were undertaken to reconcile these differences. I think it is fair to say that it is a good treaty. It takes account of the principal desires and ultimate interests of all the participants. It is fair to both victor and vanquished. But more than that, it is a treaty that will work. It does not contain the seeds of another war. It is a treaty of reconciliation, which looks to the future, not the past.

The treaty reestablishes Japan as a sovereign, independent nation. It provides for the restoration of Japanese trade with other nations, and it imposes no restrictions upon Japan's access to raw materials. The treaty recognizes the principle that Japan should make reparations to the countries which suffered from its aggression. But it does not saddle the Japanese people with a hopeless burden of reparations which would crush their economy in the years to come.

In all these respects, the treaty takes account of the peaceful advances the Japanese people have made in recent years, and seeks to establish the conditions for further progress. However, there is one thing we must all recognize. There can be no progress unless the Japanese people and their neighbors in the Pacific are made secure against the threat of aggression.

At the present time, the Pacific area is gravely affected by outright aggression and by the threat of further armed attack. One of our primary concerns in making peace with Japan, therefore, is to make Japan secure against aggression and to provide that Japan, in its turn, will so conduct itself as not to endanger the security of other nations. To accomplish this, it is important to bring Japan under the principles of the United Nations and within the protection of the mutual obligations of United Nations members. The treaty expresses Japan's intention to apply for membership in the United Nations. The other countries who sign the treaty can be counted on to work for the admission of Japan to membership. But even so, there may be delays before Japan can be admitted.

Under the treaty, therefore, the Japanese people bind themselves to accept immediately the basic obligations of a United Nations member—namely, to refrain from aggression, to settle disputes peacefully, and to support the efforts of the United Nations to maintain the peace. At the same time, the other nations who sign the treaty specifically recognize that Japan is entitled to the protection of the United Nations Charter. In a sense, these provisions are the heart of this treaty. Under them, Japan becomes part of the community of nations pledged to outlaw aggression and to support a world order based on justice. This



tying together of the Japanese peace treaty and the United Nations Charter is a long step toward building security in the Pacific. But more than this is needed.

### **World Peace Depends on Security Agreements**

In the present world situation, it has been necessary to buttress the peaceful principles of the United Nations Charter with regional arrangements for the common defense against aggression. If real security is to be attained in the Pacific, the free nations in that area must find means to work together for the common defense.

The United States recognizes this fact. Our people have suffered from past aggression in the Pacific and are determined that this country shall do its part for peace there. In recent days, we have joined with other Pacific nations in important mutual security agreements.

Last Thursday, the Philippines and the United States signed a treaty of mutual defense. Under this treaty, each country recognizes that an armed attack on the other in the Pacific area would be dangerous to its own peace and safety, and declares that it would act to meet the common danger.

Last Saturday, a similar security treaty was signed by Australia, New Zealand, and the United States.

These treaties are initial steps toward the consolidation of peace in the Pacific. It is vital that Japan be included, as soon as possible, in appropriate security arrangements for keeping peace in the Pacific. This is necessary for her own protection and the protection of other countries. The peace treaty, therefore, recognizes that Japan, as a sovereign nation, must possess the right of self-defense and the right to join in defense arrangements with other countries under the United Nations Charter.

The development of regional arrangements for defense in the Pacific will mean that such Japanese defense forces as may be created would be associated with the defense forces of other nations in the area. Japan's security would not depend exclusively on Japanese forces but on interrelated security arrangements with other countries. The Japanese contribution, by itself, would not constitute an offensive threat. But Japanese forces, together with forces of other nations, would provide mutual security against threats to the independence of the nations of the Pacific, including Japan.

At present, of course, Japan is totally unarmed. In view of the open aggression taking place near Japan, the Japanese Government has requested the United States to enter into a bilateral treaty for Japan's immediate security. Under such a treaty, the United States would maintain armed forces in Japan for the time being as a contribution to international peace and to Japan's defense against attack. Security arrangements are essen-

tial in a world in danger. In the Pacific as in other parts of the world, social and economic progress is impossible unless there is a shield which protects men from the paralysis of fear.

But our great goal, our major purpose, is not just to build bigger and stronger shields. What we want to do is to advance, as rapidly as we can, the great constructive tasks of human progress. We in the United States respect and support the many new free and independent nations in the Pacific area and Asia. We want to see them grow and prosper, as equal partners in the community of independent nations of both East and West. We want to cooperate with them, to help them in their agricultural and industrial development. We wish to see these nations attain in dignity and freedom a better life for their peoples—for that is the road to world peace.

### **Equality for Japan in Partnership of Peace**

These countries have a rich historical and cultural heritage. Today, their people are experiencing great economic and social changes. They are stirred by a new zeal for progress and independence. Already, we have seen some of the progress that can be made—progress in stamping out malaria, in building schools and training teachers, in growing more food, and creating new industries. Immense opportunities lie ahead if these countries can pursue their national destinies in a partnership of peace, free from the fear of aggression. Under this peace treaty, we believe Japan can and will join in this partnership of peace.

We look forward to the contribution which the new Japan, with its rich culture and its dedication to peace, can bring to the community of nations. We expect this contribution to grow over the years, for the signing of a peace treaty is but one part of the process of making peace. When aggression and war have severed relations between nations, many ties which bind one nation to the others are cut. Making peace is like repairing the many strands of an intercontinental cable; each strand must be spliced separately and patiently, until the full flow of communication has been restored. There is no other way to bring lasting peace than this slow and patient process, step by step, of mending and strengthening the cables of communication, of understanding between nations.

In this San Francisco Conference, we have the opportunity to take one vital step toward lasting peace. Our specific task here is to conclude the treaty of peace with Japan. That will be a great step toward general peace in the Pacific. There are other steps which need to be taken. The most important of these is the restoration of peace and security in Korea. With Japan returned to its place in the family of nations, and with the people of Korea secure, free, and united, it should be

possible to find ways to settle other problems in the Pacific which now threaten the peace.

The United States has made clear on many occasions its desire to explore with other governments at the proper time and in the proper forum how this might be accomplished. There are many well established ways in which next steps can be explored, if there is a genuine desire for peace in all quarters. But these are not matters which can be dealt with in our present conference. We have come here to take a single step—but a step of the utmost importance.

The treaty now before us offers more than talk of peace; it offers action for peace. This conference will show, therefore, who seeks to make peace, and who seeks to prevent it; who wishes to put an end to war, and who wishes to continue it.

We believe this treaty will have the support of all those nations that honestly desire to reduce the tensions which now grip the world. I pray that we shall all be united in taking this step to advance us toward greater harmony and understanding.

As we approach the peace table, let us be free of malice and hate, to the end that from here on there shall be neither victors nor vanquished among us, but only equals in the partnership of peace.

#### **OPENING STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ACHESON<sup>1</sup>**

The first plenary session of the Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Peace Treaty With Japan is convened.

The first order of business is the organization of the Conference to conclude the adoption of rules of procedure and the election of officers.

Now, before I recognize any delegate, I wish to make a few observations as to the character of this Conference. The delegations of the governments here represented have come in response to an invitation to meet for conclusion and signature of the Treaty of Peace With Japan with its attendant declarations on the terms of the August 13, 1951, text, which in the invitation was described as a final text.

This is the text which emerged from 11 months of negotiations. It is the text which the delegation of Japan, the delegations of the cosponsors of the text—the United Kingdom and the United States—and the delegations of most of the other Allied nations have come here for the purpose of signing.

The fact that the signing of the Treaty of Peace With Japan is preceded by a conference is

<sup>1</sup> Made at the Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Peace Treaty With Japan at San Francisco, Calif., on Sept. 5, in his capacity as president of the Conference; printed from transcript.

due to the desires expressed by a number of Allied powers that they should have an opportunity prior to the actual signing to make public and official statements regarding the treaty and regarding their aspirations for peace which the treaty is designed to realize.

The fact that the treaty had been negotiated by diplomatic rather than by conference methods made it seem desirable to provide an opportunity to make such an historic record prior to the ceremony of signing. That is the purpose of this Conference.

The purpose of the Conference was clearly set out in the invitation and in the accompanying oral explanations which were given in transmitting the invitations. In addition, where circumstances seem to make it appropriate, diplomatic reminders were given in order to avoid the possibility of future misunderstandings.

Therefore, while serving as your temporary presiding officer I shall conduct these proceedings in such a way as to realize the purpose for which the conference was called—that is for the conclusion and signature of the Treaty of Peace With Japan on the terms of the text before us.

#### **TEXT OF RULES OF PROCEDURE<sup>1</sup>**

##### **Section I**

##### **TERMS OF REFERENCE**

Article 1. The conference is held pursuant to and will be conducted in accordance with the terms of the invitation extended by the Government of the United States of America, a copy of which is annexed.

##### **Section II**

##### **TEMPORARY PRESIDENT**

Article 2. The chairman of the delegation of the United States of America shall be the temporary president of the conference and shall preside until the conference elects a permanent president.

##### **Section III**

##### **PERMANENT PRESIDENT**

Article 3. The permanent president of the conference shall be elected by a simple majority of the plenipotentiary delegations of states represented at the conference. The permanent president shall have authority to preside at all meetings of the conference and to decide all questions of order raised during the debates of the conference.

<sup>1</sup> Originally proposed by the United Kingdom and the United States.

## Section IV

### VICE PRESIDENT

Article 4. The conference shall elect a vice president from among the members of the plenipotentiary delegations, who shall serve at the request of the president and with the powers of the president. Should neither the president nor the vice president be in a position to preside at a session or part of a session of the conference, the president or vice president last presiding may, with the consent of the conference, invite one of the plenipotentiary delegates to serve as a temporary presiding officer with the powers of the president.

## Section V

### ELECTIONS

Article 5. All elections shall be held by secret ballot. There shall be no nominations.

## Section VI

### SECRETARY GENERAL

Article 6. The secretary general of the conference shall be appointed by the Government of the United States of America.

The secretary general shall coordinate and supervise the secretariat of the conference and shall place at the disposal of the conference the facilities necessary for the discharge of its work.

The secretary general shall be the intermediary between the delegations or their respective members in matters relating to the organization and functioning of the conference, and between the delegates and the Federal, state, and local governments of the United States.

## Section VII

### PARTICIPANTS

Article 7. Representation at the conference shall be confined to the plenipotentiary delegations accredited respectively by governments of Allied powers invited by the Government of the United States of America to participate in the conference. The Japanese delegation shall be entitled to be present without vote at all public meetings of the conference and shall be afforded by the presiding officer appropriate opportunity to be heard prior to the ceremony of signing the treaty.

Article 8. Co-signature of the treaty of peace with Japan does not, as between allied powers (as defined in treaty), imply recognition of any state or government to which any signatory has not previously extended recognition.

Article 9. Participants in the conference shall be limited to the following:

(1) Delegates and their alternates accredited by the invited governments to the conference, shall have the right of attending all sessions of the con-

ference; shall have the right of speaking thereat subject to those rules of procedure and the decisions of the conference; shall have the right of voting subject to restrictions herein specified.

(2) Other representatives including technical adviser and staff of the delegations accredited by the invited governments to the conference, shall have the privilege of attending all public sessions of the conference unless otherwise determined by the conference, but they shall not have the right to vote or address the conference except at the request of their plenipotentiary delegates.

(3) Members of the secretariat shall have the privilege of attending all sessions of the conference as necessary to carry out the functions of the secretariat.

## Section VIII

### LANGUAGES OF THE CONFERENCE

Article 10. The host government will make available simultaneous oral interpreting services as between English, French, Russian and Spanish. Delegates may speak, however in any other language provided they furnish advance interpretations thereof into any one of the foregoing languages.

Article 11. The text of the treaty shall be circulated at the conference in the following languages: English, French, Russian, Spanish and Japanese.

Article 12. Verbatim minutes of the plenary sessions will be issued in the language of the host country, English. In addition, the secretariat will circulate to the delegations oral statements which are made in one of the languages of the treaty other than English, provided the speaker makes available said text to the secretariat.

## Section IX

### ORDER OF SEATING, ETC.

Article 13. Conference seating, voting and other points of precedence shall be determined by the alphabetic order of names of the accrediting States, in the English language.

## Section X

### CREDENTIALS

Article 14. The secretary general will examine and report to the conference on (a) the credentials of persons representing the governments invited to participate in the conference, and (b) full powers referred to in the preamble of the August 13 text of the treaty.

## Section XI

### MEETINGS OF THE CONFERENCE

Article 15. The president will ordinarily ascertain the sense of the meeting in lieu of a formal vote. If a vote is taken, attendance by a majority



of the plenipotentiary delegations shall constitute a quorum and the decision shall be by a majority of the plenipotentiary delegations present and voting at the meeting. Each plenipotentiary delegation shall have but one vote.

Article 16. The sessions of the conference shall be public unless otherwise ordered by a majority vote.

## Section XII

### CONDUCT OF BUSINESS

Article 17. Having regard to the special and limited terms of reference of this conference, its business, after adoption of the rules of procedure, shall be confined to:

- (1) Election of officers.
- (2) Report on credentials.
- (3) Statements on behalf of the two governments jointly sponsoring the treaty text.
- (4) Statements by participating delegations.
- (5) Report of secretary general on conformity of the different language texts of the treaty.
- (6) Ceremony of signing the treaty of peace with Japan.

Article 18. Immediately following the statements on behalf of the two sponsoring governments, which shall not exceed one hour each, each other delegation may make a statement, in no case to exceed one hour, with reference to the August 13, 1951, text of treaty of peace with Japan. When a delegation has made this statement that delegation may not be heard again on the subject until all other delegations as yet not heard shall have had the opportunity to make a statement; provided, however, that if a statement by any delegation puts questions to another delegation, that other delegation, immediately upon the conclusion of the statement, may have not to exceed five minutes to answer. Delegations may at any time submit and circulate relevant written statements which may, with the approval of the presiding officer, be incorporated into the permanent record.

After all the delegations desiring to make statements have been heard, then the conference shall decide as to what, if any, further statements will be permitted and under what conditions.

Delegations shall be called upon in the order in which they have signified to the secretary general their desire to be heard and failing any such timely signification, will be called upon by the presiding officer in accordance with precedence under Article 13, starting with the name of a country to be chosen by lot.

Article 19. No delegate or representative may address the conference without having previously been recognized by the presiding officer. The presiding officer shall have the power to call a speaker to order and if the speaker does not conform, shall terminate his recognition and call upon the next speaker.

Article 20. During the discussion of any matter, a delegate or representative may raise a point of order by calling attention to the rules of procedure believed to be infringed. The point of order shall immediately be decided by the presiding officer in accordance with these rules of procedure. Exception to the ruling of the presiding officer shall be immediately put to a vote without debate, and the ruling of the presiding officer shall stand unless it is overruled by a majority of the plenipotentiary delegations present and voting at the meeting.

Article 21. During the discussion of any matter, a delegate or representative may move the suspension, adjournment of the meeting or the closure of debate. Such motion shall not be debated but shall be immediately put to a vote. The presiding officer may limit the length of statements made with respect to matters raised under Articles 20 and 21.

Article 22. Subject to Article 19, the following motions shall have precedence in the following order over all other proposals or motions before the meeting: (1) to suspend a meeting; (2) to adjourn a meeting; (3) to close the debate.

## Section XIII

### MINUTES AND DOCUMENTS OF THE CONFERENCE

Article 23. The secretary general shall cause to be kept verbatim minutes of the plenary sessions of the conference. Any speaker wishing to correct the verbatim minutes for accuracy of translation shall submit his observations in writing to the secretariat within thirty-six hours after the provisional minutes have been circulated.

Article 24. The secretary general shall cause to be prepared for distribution among the participating governments a record of proceedings which shall include the verbatim minutes of the plenary sessions.

## Section XIV

Article 25. These rules, having been adopted by a majority of the plenipotentiary delegations voting, shall be effective unless amended in like manner.

### STATEMENT BY JOHN FOSTER DULLES<sup>4</sup>

We have met here for a consecrated purpose. We shall here make peace. "Blessed are the peacemakers." But the most blessed of this peace are not those of us who assemble here. The foundation for this peace was laid by the many who gave up their lives in faith that the very magnitude of their sacrifice would compel those who survived to find and take the way to peace.

<sup>4</sup> Made on behalf of the U.S. delegation at the second plenary session on Sept. 5 and released to the press by the conference on the same date.

We are here to redeem, in some small measure, the vast debt we owe.

That task is not a simple one. Victory usually gives power greater than should be possessed by those who are moved by the passions that war engenders. That is a principal reason why war has become a self-perpetuating institution.

The treaty before us is a step toward breaking the vicious cycle of war—victory—peace—war. The nations will here make a peace of justice, not a peace of vengeance.

### The Occupation Prepared the Way

True peace is possible because of what has been accomplished by 6 years of Allied Occupation. That Occupation was calm and purposeful. Japan's war-making power was destroyed. The authority and influence of those who committed Japan to armed conquest was eliminated. Stern justice was meted out to the war criminals, while mercy was shown the innocent. There has come freedom of speech, of religion, of thought; and respect for fundamental human rights. There has been established, by the will of the people, a peacefully inclined and responsible government, which we are happy to welcome here.

The Allied Occupation goals set forth in the Potsdam Surrender Terms have been met, with the loyal cooperation of the Japanese people. It is now time to end that Occupation, and make a peace which will restore Japan as a sovereign equal.

It is possible now to make that kind of a peace, to make this a peace of reconciliation, because the Japan of today is transformed from the Japan of yesterday.

The past is not forgotten or excused. Bitterness and distrust remain the sentiment of many. That is human. Those who have suffered less have no warrant to set themselves up as moral judges of those who have suffered more. But time, and the good use to which it has been put in Japan, have somewhat healed the scars of war. New hopes have gradually displaced old fears. Now, by an effort of self-control which is perhaps unprecedented in history, the Allies present to Japan a treaty which shows no trace of angry passion.

That is not merely an act of generosity toward a vanquished foe, it is an act of enlightened self-interest. For a treaty warped by passion often becomes a boomerang which, thrown against an enemy, returns to strike its authors.

For this treaty we are deeply indebted to the man who led the Allied Powers to victory in the Pacific. After that victory he devoted 5½ years to service in Japan as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. As such he showed not only magnanimity, but strength without which magnanimity is counted weakness. He provided the Occupation with moral leadership which has been the impulsion for the kind of peace we make. The

present generation and generations to come owe much to General MacArthur.

### Eleven Months of Conference

In framing the peace, the United States has taken an initiative. That was plainly our duty.

Some now find it expedient to disparage the role played by the United States in the Pacific war. None did so in the hour of victory. Then, by a unanimous Allied act, the United States was given the exclusive power to name the Supreme Commander for all the Allied Powers and to direct the Occupation which would prepare Japan for the peace to come. That Allied act put us in a position uniquely to judge *when* the Japanese were prepared for peace. It surely entitled us, indeed it obligated us, to take timely steps to bring our Occupation responsibilities to their normal predestined end.

We first moved in this matter 4 years ago. In 1947 the United States proposed a preliminary conference of the governments represented on the Far Eastern Commission to consider plans for a Japanese peace treaty. That proposal was blocked by the insistence of the Soviet Union that the treaty could only be considered by the Council of Foreign Ministers where the Soviet Union would have veto power. The Soviet Union continued stubbornly to adhere to that position.

Last year the United States decided to abandon the conference method, which afforded excessive possibilities of obstruction, and to seek peace through diplomatic processes which no single nation could thwart. That has been done with the hearty cooperation of most of the Allies and has resulted in a finished text.

The negotiations began about a year ago when the Allies principally concerned were gathering to attend the U. N. General Assembly in New York. The various delegations principally concerned had frequent consultations at that time. Then came conferences at many capitals and many written exchanges of views. A U. S. Presidential Mission toured the globe, visiting ten capitals of countries especially concerned. Meanwhile, the United Kingdom was exploring the problem within the Commonwealth, and its representative will tell you more of that.

The first round of discussions dealt with the question of whether it was *time* for peace and, if so, what basic *principles* should be applied. In this connection the United States outlined seven principles which it felt ought to govern the framing of the Treaty.

We found complete agreement to the urgency of prompt peace and general agreement as to the basic principles. So, in January of this year, the United States undertook to make the first draft of a text which would translate the agreed principles into treaty words. That draft was circulated last March, and was subjected to in-

tensive study by over 20 countries. These included not only the Far Eastern Commission countries, but others which had expressed interest. The American states were kept informed, as was their due. Mexico had actively participated in the Pacific war, as had Brazil in the European war. All had made important political, economic, and moral contributions.

Meanwhile, the United Kingdom produced a text of its own, drafted in the light of the Commonwealth conferences. Then in June, the United States and the United Kingdom combined their parallel efforts and jointly drafted a text to reconcile and reflect still more fully the different views that had been developed. This text was circulated to Allied Powers during the first half of July and was kept open for further changes until mid-August.

Throughout this period, the Soviet Union took an active, though reluctant, part. We had several conferences with Yakov Malik and our Governments have exchanged ten memoranda and drafts.

Every nation which has constructively interested itself in the treaty can claim authorship of important parts of the present text. Also each of these nations can claim the equally honorable distinction of voluntarily subordinating some special interest so that a broad base of unity might be found. The Allied Powers have been conducting what in effect, is an 11-months' peace conference participated in by so many nations as to make this treaty the most broadly based peace treaty in all history.

Any who are interested in studying the evolutionary processes which have been at work can compare our March draft with the present text. To make that comparison easy, a parallel-column document has been prepared for distribution here. It shows how our conference methods have worked.

The treaty remains, as first agreed, a nonpunitive, nondiscriminatory treaty, which will restore Japan to dignity, equality, and opportunity in the family of nations. But it has been found increasingly possible to do justice to particular situations without violating these basic concepts.

I now turn to a consideration of the principal provisions of the text.

### The Treaty Terms

(1) *The Preamble* is an important part of the treaty. It affords the Japanese Nation the opportunity to record intentions and aspirations which the whole world welcomes.

Japan declares its intention to apply for membership in the United Nations; to conform to the principles of the Charter; to adhere to the new ideals of human rights and freedoms which have become implanted in the Constitution and legislation of Japan; and, in public and private trade and commerce, to conform to internationally accepted fair practices.

If Japan's intentions in these respects are sincere, which we believe, and if they are pursued with resolution, they will go far to restore good will between the Japanese and Allied people.

It may be asked why, if that is so, the treaty does not attempt to put the Japanese under legal compulsion in these respects. There are good reasons for not doing so. Japan, when it applies for membership in the United Nations, should do so because it *wants* to be a member, not because the Allies compel it. Eighty million people cannot be compelled from without, to respect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of their fellows. Fair trade practices cannot be made a formal obligation when they have not yet been spelled out in international conventions. In general, treaty obligations should only be such as can be precisely formulated, so that the parties will clearly know just what are their rights and what are their duties. Where applicable conventions exist, Japan will voluntarily adhere to them, as set out in the declaration appended to the treaty.

(2) *Sovereignty Restored.* Chapter I ends the state of war, with consequent recognition of the full sovereignty of the Japanese people. Let us note that the sovereignty recognized is the "sovereignty of the Japanese people".

(3) *Territory.* What is the territory of Japanese sovereignty? Chapter II deals with that. Japan formally ratifies the territorial provisions of the Potsdam Surrender Terms, provisions which, so far as Japan is concerned, were actually carried into effect 6 years ago.

The Potsdam Surrender Terms constitute the only definition of peace terms to which, and by which, Japan and the Allied Powers as a whole are bound. There have been some private understandings between some Allied Governments; but by these Japan was not bound, nor were other Allies bound. Therefore, the treaty embodies article 8 of the Surrender Terms which provided that Japanese sovereignty should be limited to Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and some minor islands. The renunciations contained in article 2 of chapter II strictly and scrupulously conform to that surrender term.

Some question has been raised as to whether the geographical name "Kurile Islands" mentioned in article 2 (c) includes the Habomai Islands. It is the view of the United States that it does not. If, however, there were a dispute about this, it could be referred to the International Court of Justice under article 22.

Some Allied Powers suggested that article 2 should not merely delimit Japanese sovereignty according to Potsdam, but specify precisely the ultimate disposition of each of the ex-Japanese territories. This, admittedly, would have been neater. But it would have raised questions as to which there are now no agreed answers. We had either to give Japan peace on the Potsdam Surrender Terms or deny peace to Japan while the



Allies quarrel about what shall be done with what Japan is prepared, and required, to give up. Clearly, the wise course was to proceed now, so far as Japan is concerned, leaving the future to resolve doubts by invoking international solvents other than this treaty.

Article 3 deals with the Ryukyus and other islands to the south and southeast of Japan. These, since the surrender, have been under the sole administration of the United States.

Several of the Allied Powers urged that the treaty should require Japan to renounce its sovereignty over these islands in favor of United States sovereignty. Others suggested that these islands should be restored completely to Japan.

In the face of this division of Allied opinion, the United States felt that the best formula would be to permit Japan to retain residual sovereignty, while making it possible for these islands to be brought into the U. N. trusteeship system, with the United States as administering authority.

You will recall that the Charter of the United Nations contemplates extension of the trusteeship system to "territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War" (article 77). The future trusteeship agreement will, no doubt, determine the future civil status of the inhabitants in relation to Japan while affording the administering authority the possibility of carrying out article 84 of the Charter, which provides that "It shall be the duty of the administering authority to ensure that the trust territory shall play its part in the maintenance of international peace and security".

A peace which limits Japanese territory according to the Potsdam Surrender Terms, naturally leads one to ask, can a growing population, now numbering over 80 million, survive on the Japanese home islands? A clue to the correct answer is the fact that when Japan had a vast colonial empire into which the Japanese people could freely emigrate, few did so. Formosa, a rich, uncrowded land with temperate climate, attracted, in 55 years, a total Japanese population of about 350,000. Korea, under Japanese control since 1905, attracted a total Japanese population of about 650,000. In South Sakhalin there were 350,000 Japanese and in the Kurile Islands about 11,000. Japan's colonies helped assure Japan access to food and raw materials, but they were no population outlet. Japanese, like other people, prefer to live at home. So far as emigration is concerned, the territorial clauses of the treaty do not establish restraints greater than those which 98 percent of the Japanese people voluntarily put upon themselves.

Of course growing populations create problems in Japan and elsewhere. The Japanese will need to develop the capacity to perform services which others want, so that in exchange they can buy the food and raw materials they need. This calls for willingness on the part of the Japanese

people to work hard, to work efficiently and to work with creative imagination so that they can anticipate the economic wants of others. Each of the Allied Powers also has a responsibility. The Surrender Terms promised the Japanese "access to raw materials" and "participation in world trade relations". Peoples who are ready and willing to work and to create what others want, should have the means to do so. Under such conditions the present territorial status of Japan is no cause for alarm.

(4) *Security.* Chapter III deals with security, a problem which has not been, and never is, automatically solved by victory. By article 5, Japan undertakes to live peacefully, in accordance with the principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations. We hope that Japan will promptly become a member of the United Nations. If this were certain, article 5 would be unnecessary. But, in the past, veto power has been used to block the admission of nations qualified for membership. So it is prudent to write into the treaty that, as provided by article 2 (6) of the Charter, Japan will settle its international disputes by peaceful means; will refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force; and will give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the Charter.

These provisions completely meet the desire which some nations have expressed that the treaty should bind Japan to peaceful processes and explicitly prohibit Japan from acting forcibly, alone or in coalition, against any other nation. There can be nothing more sweeping than the renunciation of offensive force expressed in article 5 (a) (ii) of the treaty.

In order, however, that this treaty, like the United Nations Charter, should make it perfectly clear that the prohibition against the use of force does not deprive Japan of the right of self-defense, subdivision (c) of article 5 contains a recognition that Japan as a sovereign nation possesses what article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations refers to as "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense".

Article 6 of the treaty calls for ending the Occupation not later than 90 days after the treaty comes into force. However, Japan, as contemplated by article 51 of the U. N. Charter, may enter into collective security arrangements, and these might, in part, be implemented by Allied elements which were in Japan when the treaty came into force. Accordingly, it seemed useful to make it clear that, under such circumstances, these elements would not have to be physically removed from Japan before they could serve as collective security forces. This would be a burdensome requirement, and a risky one for it would for a time leave Japan wholly defenseless, in close proximity to proved aggressors possessed of great military strength. To avoid that danger, article 6 pro-

vides that Occupation elements now in Japanese territory may stay on for Japan's defense, if this is wanted by Japan.

These remaining military elements would, of course, have characteristics and powers very different from what they had as occupation forces. They would have only such status in Japan as Japan would voluntarily have given them.

The security provisions which we have reviewed are necessary if the treaty of peace is honestly to restore sovereignty to Japan. It has been suggested that the treaty ought to deny to Japan "the inherent right of collective self-defense" and permit only a token right of "individual self-defense."

That kind of a peace, in this present kind of a world, would be a fraud. To give a sovereignty which cannot be defended, is to give an empty husk. Indefensible sovereignty is not sovereignty at all. An undefended and indefensible Japan would be so subject to the menace of surrounding power that Japan would not in fact be able to lead an independent existence.

It has been suggested that a collective security arrangement with the United States, such as Japan is considering, would not be a free act or what the Japanese people really want.

That is not a suggestion which will command credence here. Nearly two-thirds of the delegations here are from countries which either have, or are about to have, voluntary association in collective security arrangements which include the United States. These delegations will assume, and rightfully assume, that the Japanese people are like their own people, and like most free peoples, in wanting the collective security which may deter aggression.

When I was in Japan last February this topic was discussed with the Japanese for the first time. I then said publicly that Japan, if it wished, could share collective protection against direct aggression. In order, however, to make perfectly clear our Government's position in the matter I had to say:

"That, however, is not a choice which the United States is going to impose upon Japan. It is an invitation. The United States is not interested in slavish conduct . . . We are concerned only with the brave and the free. The choice must be Japan's own choice."

No person in this room, and I mean that literally, honestly believes that Japan seeks collective security with the United States because it is coerced. That is palpably absurd.

As the President of the United States pointed out in his opening address to us, security in the Pacific area is being developed on a *collective* basis which, through combination, enables each nation to get security without making itself into what could be an offensive threat. That is one way to approach the problem. The other way is to prohibit collective security and to follow the policy of "let each country defend itself from aggressors

as it likes or as best it can." That latter way, Generalissimo Stalin said, addressing his Party on March 10, 1939, means "conniving at aggression."

Any nation which seeks to deny to Japan the right to collective security and which insists that Japan must stand alone is, at heart, a conniver at aggression. Those who sign this treaty will not lend themselves to that design.

I have expounded the philosophy of the treaty with reference to security because it is a philosophy which has been challenged. I hope, however, that the time I have given to this subject will not lead any delegations to feel that military matters are our principal preoccupation.

Security from armed aggression is a *negative* asset. Our dedication is to the *positive* side of national life and of individual life. Throughout the Occupation, the effort has been to create a climate conducive to human development. To that end, the United States has made a tremendous moral investment. President Truman, in his opening address to us, emphasized the social revolution which has been taking place in Japan, the sweeping away of militarism, the establishment of universal suffrage, the extensive land reforms and the rapid growth of labor unions. Also, we are not ashamed of the fact that it was under the Occupation that the Japanese people adopted a constitution forever barring war as an instrument of their national policy. If today we are compelled to think in terms of a treaty which will enable Japan to protect its sovereignty and independence it is not because we seek a re-militarized Japan—that we have done everything in our power to prevent—but because social and economic progress cannot be achieved in the cold climate of fear.

(5) *Japanese prisoners.* An outstanding humanitarian feature of the Japanese surrender was the Allied promise to return Japanese prisoners to their homes. However, evidence produced before the United Nations General Assembly last September indicated that large numbers of Japanese soldiers, who had surrendered to the Soviet Union 5 years before, had not yet been repatriated. The United Nations expressed its concern and set up a commission to study this matter. In order to make clear that the Allied undertaking to Japan survives until it has been performed, article 9 of the Potsdam Surrender Terms has been incorporated into the treaty of peace (article 6 (b)). We earnestly hope that it will be fulfilled, and tragic anguish be allayed.

(6) *Economic matters.* Chapter IV deals with trade and commerce. The text is somewhat technical but the words add up to this; Japan is not subjected to any permanent discriminations and disabilities, her economy is unrestricted and no limitations whatever are placed upon her right to trade with each and every country.

The permanent relations between Japan and the Allied Powers, as regards trading, maritime, and other commercial relations (article 12); as



regards high seas fishing (article 9); as regards international air transport (article 13), are to be negotiated between Japan and Allied Powers so desiring. Pending the conclusion of such treaties, and for a 4-year interim period, each Allied Power will be entitled to most-favored-nation treatment as regards customs duties, but only on a basis of reciprocity.

These are liberal treaty clauses. The fulfillment of the hopes placed in them will, however, depend on whether Japan lives up to its intention, proclaimed in the preamble, "to conform to internationally accepted fair practices," and on whether the Allied Powers, by their domestic legislation, extend to Japan trading possibilities which are reasonable, having regard to their own domestic requirements. On these matters, a peace treaty can do no more than point the way to a healthy trade relationship and create the opportunity to go in that way. That this treaty does.

(7) *Reparations* is usually the most controversial aspect of peace making. The present peace is no exception.

On the one hand, there are claims both vast and just. Japan's aggression caused tremendous cost, losses, and suffering. Governments represented here have claims which total many billions of dollars and China could plausibly claim as much again. One hundred thousand million dollars would be a modest estimate of the whole.

On the other hand, to meet these claims, there stands a Japan presently reduced to four home islands which are unable to produce the food its people need to live, or the raw materials they need to work. Since the surrender, Japan has been 2 billion dollars short of the money required to pay for the food and raw materials she had to import for survival on a minimum basis. The United States had made good that 2 billion dollar deficit. We accepted that as one of our occupation responsibilities. But the United States is entitled to look forward to Japan's becoming economically self-sustaining, so as to end dependence on us; and it is not disposed, directly or indirectly, to pay Japan's future reparations.

Under these circumstances, if the treaty validated, or kept contingently alive, monetary reparation claims against Japan, her ordinary commercial credit would vanish, the incentive of her people would be destroyed and they would sink into a misery of body and spirit which would make them an easy prey to exploitation. Totalitarian demagogues would surely rise up to promise relief through renewed aggression with the help of those nearby who, as we have seen in Korea, are already disposed to be the aggressors. The old menace would appear in aggravated form.

Such a treaty, while promoting unity among aggressors would promote disunity among many Allied Powers. There would be bitter competition for the largest possible percentage of an illusory pot of gold. Already, several countries have

approached the United States with suggestions that their particular claims for reparation should be favored at the expense of others.

A treaty which, on the one hand, encouraged division among the nonaggression states and, on the other hand, brought recruits to the side of the aggressive states, would be a treaty which would recklessly squander the opportunity of victory. The parties to such a treaty would expose themselves to new perils greater than those which they have barely survived.

These conflicting considerations were fully discussed, until there emerged a solution which gives moral satisfaction to the claims of justice and which gives material satisfaction to the maximum extent compatible with political and economic health in the Pacific area.

The treaty recognizes, clearly and unambiguously, that Japan *should* pay reparation to the Allied Powers for the damage and suffering caused by it during the war.

It then goes on to dedicate to the implementation of that principle, certain assets which Japan does have in surplus and which could be put to work to help to compensate those nations which suffered the most from Japan's wartime acts.

Japan has a population not now fully employed, and it has industrial capacity not now fully employed. Both of these aspects of unemployment are caused by lack of raw materials. These, however, are possessed in goodly measure by the countries which were overrun by Japan's armed aggression. If these war-devastated countries send to Japan the raw materials which many of them have in abundance, the Japanese could process them for the creditor countries and by these services, freely given, provide appreciable reparations. The arrangements could cover not merely consumers goods but machinery and capital goods which would enable underdeveloped countries to speed up developing their own industry, so as hereafter to lessen their dependence on outside industrial power.

This is, in essence, the formula expressed in article 14 (a) 1. It results from prolonged exchanges of views, particularly with such countries as the Philippines and Indonesia, which were occupied by Japanese forces and injured in a way which places on the Allied Powers as a whole, and on Japan, a very clear duty to seek all means of reparation which are realistic.

I am frank to say that the treaty is a better, fairer treaty than first drafted. That results from the proper insistence of some governments that all possibilities of reparation should be exhaustively explored. That has been done, and the result is a fresh demonstration of the worth of the free processes of free and equal people. Those processes have here produced a treaty formula which serves the ideal of justice within an economic framework which can benefit all concerned.

In addition to this source of future reparation,



the treaty validates the taking, by Allied Powers, of Japanese property within their jurisdictions.

By article 16, Japanese property in neutral and ex-enemy countries is to be transferred to the International Red Cross for the benefit of former prisoners of war and their families, on the basis of equity, to make some compensation for undue hardship suffered, often in violation of the Geneva conventions. The United States, in response to some Allied inquiries, has indicated that, since its own prisoners of war have received some indemnification out of proceeds of Japanese property we seized, we would assume that equity would require first distribution to those who have had no comparable indemnification.

Allied property within Japan is to be returned. Where this cannot be done, because of war damage, there will be compensation in blocked yen in accordance with pending Japanese domestic legislation.

(8) *Korea*. Article 21 makes special provision for Korea. The Republic of Korea will not sign the treaty of peace only because Korea was never at war with Japan. It tragically lost its independence long before this war began, and did not regain independence of Japan until after Japan surrendered. Many individual Koreans steadfastly fought Japan. But they were individuals, not recognized governments.

Nevertheless, Korea has a special claim on Allied consideration, the more so as it has not yet proved possible for the Allies to achieve their goal of a Korea which is free and independent. Korea is, unhappily, only half free and only half independent; and even that fractional freedom and independence has been cruelly mangled and menaced by armed aggression from the North.

Most of the Allied Powers have been seeking to make good their promise of freedom and independence and, as members of the United Nations, to suppress the aggression of which Korea is the victim. By this treaty, the Allies will obtain for Korea Japan's formal recognition of Korea's independence, and Japan's consent to the vesting in the Republic of Korea, of the very considerable Japanese property in Korea. Korea will also be placed on a parity with the Allied Powers as regards postwar trading, maritime, fishing and other commercial arrangements. Thus the treaty, in many ways, treats Korea like an Allied Power.

(9) *China*. The absence of China from this conference is a matter of deep regret. Hostilities between Japan and China first began in 1931 and open warfare began in 1937. China suffered the longest and the deepest from Japanese aggression. It is greatly to be deplored that the Sino-Japanese War cannot be formally terminated at this occasion. Unhappily, civil war within China and the attitudes of the Allied Governments have created a situation such that there is not general interna-

tional agreement upon a single Chinese voice with both the right and the power to bind the Chinese nation to terms of peace. Some think that one government meets these tests. Some think another meets them. Some doubt that either meets them. No majority can be found for any present action regarding China. Thus, the Allies were faced with hard choices.

They could defer any peace with Japan until they could agree that there was in China a government possessed of both legitimacy and authority. It would, however, be wrong, cruel and stupid to penalize Japan because there is civil war in China and international disagreement regarding China.

As another approach, each Allied Power could refuse to sign a treaty of peace with Japan unless a Chinese government of its choice was cosigner with it. That, we ascertained, would leave Japan at war with so many Allied Powers that Japan would get only a small measure of the peace she has earned. Indeed, there is no reason to believe that Japan, an essential party, would willingly cooperate in a program leading to that end. To exert compulsion, in this matter, would create resentment in Japan, and it would activate and aggravate Allied division in the face of a grave world-wide menace which requires maximum unity.

The remaining choice was for the Allied Powers generally to proceed to conclude peace without any present Chinese cosignature, leaving China and Japan to make their own peace, on terms, however, which would guarantee full protection of the rights and interests of China.

That is the choice reflected by the present treaty. By article 26, China is given the right to a treaty of peace with Japan, on the same terms as the present treaty. The victorious Allies, which sign the treaty, take nothing for themselves that they do not assure equally to China. Also, by article 21, China, without need of signature, gets the sweeping renunciation by Japan (article 10) of all Japan's special rights and interests in China, in accordance with a formula suggested by the Republic of China. Also, China receives automatically, and without need of signature, the benefit of article 14 (a) 2 which validates the seizure of Japanese property subject to its jurisdiction. The treaty preserves, in full, the rights of China as one of the Allied victors in this war.

(10) *Final Clauses*. Chapter VII contains clauses which are largely matters of protocol. Of these article 23, dealing with ratification, gives those signatories to the treaty which have been actively concerned with the Occupation, a special position, for 9 months, regarding the bringing of the treaty into force. But after 9 months all of the Allied Powers stand on an equal footing as regards bringing the treaty into force as between themselves and Japan.

## Good Peace Now or Better Peace Never

Such, in broad outline, are the main aspects of the treaty that awaits our signature.

It contains, no doubt, imperfections. No one is completely satisfied. But it is a good treaty. It does not contain the seeds of another war. It is truly a treaty of peace.

We may hear a suggestion that we should not now complete, by signature, this product of a year's negotiation, but resort to new procedures, with new parties. It may be pretended that thereby we can gain greater unity and more perfection. At first that may sound plausible and tempting. It may seem to offer the partially dissatisfied a chance for great satisfaction.

In some Allied countries there are organized groups which urge that the treaty could be changed merely to benefit them, leaving everything else intact. If all of these proposals were to be brought together, it would be apparent that the cumulative effect would be destructive of any agreed peace.

Fortunately, there are also in most of the Allied countries those who see with truer vision. They know that this treaty is good to the point where it cannot be made better without its becoming worse. Better words might theoretically be found; but to seek these is to let escape what is now within our grasp. There come times when to seek the perfect is to lose the good. This is such a time.

There is greater unity now than we are apt to find if there is renegotiation. The treaty has been painstakingly built by the delicate processes of diplomacy, helped by an unusual display of self-restraint and good will. But it is not wise to assume that those qualities will be ever present and that differences can always be composed.

There is a larger measure of satisfaction now than we can ever get again. Delay will inevitably set in motion corroding forces and contradictory efforts which will block each other and frustrate the possibilities inherent in a common effort of good will.

In terms of Japan's future, delay would cost a price which makes petty all the sacrifices incident to present action. The great goals of victory will have been made unattainable.

It was our common hope that, out of the fiery purge of war, there would rise a new Japan. That was no foolish hope. Japan has great culture and tradition which are capable of producing distinctively, but no less authentically, those virtues which all nations and peoples must possess if there is to be a world-wide commonwealth of peace.

In order, however, that that potentiality shall become actuality, Japan needs free political institutions in a climate conducive to their vigorous growth; social progress; an equal administration of justice; an awareness of human dignity; a sense of self-respect, of respect for others.

Above all, Japan needs the will to live at peace with others as good neighbors.

All of this is possible, if we make peace now. It becomes impossible, or at best improbable, if Japan's long-deferred hopes are now blasted.

There are, in Japan, new born institutions of freedom. But they will not flourish if military rule continues indefinitely to be supreme.

Dignity cannot be developed by those who are subject to alien control, however benign.

Self-respect is not felt by those who have no rights of their own in the world, who live on charity and who trade on sufferance.

Regard for justice rarely animates those who are subjected to such grave injustice as would be the denial of present peace.

Fellowship is not the mood of peoples who are denied fellowship.

The United States, which since the surrender has directed the Occupation on behalf of all the Allies, says solemnly to each of the Allies: unless you now give Japan peace and freedom on such honorable terms as have been negotiated, the situation will rapidly deteriorate.

The surrender terms have served their every legitimate purpose. Under them "the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the State shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers." To perpetuate that subjection, which has existed for 6 years, into more years, would be to pervert the Occupation into an instrument of imperialism and colonialism. The United States wants none of that, and we know that most of you want none of that.

It is time to end the subjection of the Japanese Government to Allied command. It is time to end the Occupation and to recognize that, henceforth, it is the Japanese people who exercise complete sovereignty in Japan. It is time to welcome Japan as an equal and honorable member of the family of nations.

That is what the pending treaty will do.

No nation is bound to sign the treaty. This is no conference that wields legal compulsion. The only compulsion is the moral compulsion of grave circumstances. They unite to cry aloud: Let us make peace.

## CLOSING STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ACHESON<sup>\*</sup>

YOUR EXCELLENCIES, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:

We have come to the closing moments of our conference, and it falls to the president to say the

<sup>\*</sup>Made on Sept. 8 after the signing of the peace treaty by delegates of the following countries and of Japan: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Cambodia, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras,

(footnote continued on page 460)



last words of farewell. May I begin with some words which are very close to my heart, in expressing the deepest appreciation of which I am capable to this conference for the trust which it reposed in me in selecting me to serve as your presiding officer.

I have endeavored to attain your trust. May I also say to this gracious city of San Francisco and to the great State of California, and to those thousands of volunteer workers who worked so steadily and so happily to make our meeting a success, to make our stay in San Francisco so pleasant, and who have contributed so greatly to the happiness and enjoyment of the members of our family, how deeply grateful all of us are to the city, to the State and to the thousands of men and women of San Francisco and California who have worked to make our conference a success.

I know that as you sat here this morning and watched this very moving ceremony, a great crowd of memories came into your minds, not only into the minds of the delegates in this hall and the audience in this hall, but in the vast audience throughout the length and breadth of the United States. A great flood of memories of past days, days which were anxious, days which were full of sorrow, days which were full of grim determination. And I know that many families today were conscious of absences. And many were conscious that those who were absent had given their lives to bring about this day.

And it was fitting—it was very fitting—that all of those memories of all of these people here throughout this country, throughout the world, should culminate today in this act of reconciliation, because what you have seen this morning is something unique in history.

You have seen an act of greatness of spirit, an act, a true act or reconciliation and because it was that, it was an act which, as Mr. Jaywardene [of Ceylon] pointed out, as Zafrullah Khan [of Pakistan] pointed out, as Mr. Dulles pointed out, is in accordance with the fundamental moral principles of the great spiritual teachers and leaders of all nations and of all religions.

And it was for this reason, I think, again as Mr. Dulles suggested to us last night, that we were able to accomplish here what we have accomplished,

*(footnote continued from page 459)*

Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United States, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam. For text of treaty, see BULLETIN of Aug. 27, 1951, p. 349, and also Department of State publication 4330.

The following countries were represented at the conference but did not sign: Czechoslovakia, Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The following were invited to the conference but did not attend: Burma, India, Yugoslavia.

because all of us, in the words of Benjamin Franklin, all of us doubted something of our infallibility, and all of us worked together, giving up much that was close to our hearts, much that was close to our economic interests, for the purpose of bringing about this peace of reconciliation.

And we were able to do that because we were doing something which lifted our spirits, something of which we were proud. There was nothing mean. There was nothing sordid which lurked in any corner of this treaty. There was nothing hidden, nothing that could not bear the broad great light of day. And we were able to join in that sort of an effort, and we were able to sink our differences because we were going forward in a great effort, making a great new step in history, and hoping from this day forward a new chapter is opening in the history of the world.

And, as Mr. Morrison said to us this morning, this is not an ending; this is a beginning. We signed this great treaty this morning, but we must live this treaty from this day on. And it depends upon each nation, each individual represented here, each individual of each nation, to make this treaty be what it is in words. And by no means, least of all, it rests with our Japanese friends to see that this treaty yields its true fruits.

And I say to them that a great broad highway to a position of equality, of honor, of friendship in the world lies open to you. All the obstacles on that highway have been cleared away so far as governments can clear them away.

The obstacles that remain only you can remove, and you can remove those if you act with other peoples with understanding and with generosity and with kindness. And all those qualities are inherent in the nature of your people, and what we urge you to do is make those qualities, which are so inherent in the Japanese people, the policy of the Japanese Government.

We regret that there are some who were unable or unwilling to join our meeting, and others, we regret, who came here but were unable or unwilling to join in this great constructive effort. But what we have done here, we have done both for ourselves and for those who did not come here, because we have laid a great peace for all peoples, not merely those here, but for all peoples throughout the world.

And those who were unwilling to work with us and those who criticized our efforts, for those people we feel no bitterness, but we urge them now to join in the great effort which lies before all of us.

And may I close this conference with words which, in many languages, in many forms, in many religions, have brought comfort and strength.

"May the peace of God, which passeth all understanding, be amongst us and remain with us always."



## Answer to Soviet Charges Against Japanese Treaty

John Foster Dulles, consultant to the Secretary, upon request from the New York *Times*, made on September 3 the following answers to the principal charges that have been made by the Soviet Union concerning the preparation and content of the proposed Japanese treaty:

### I

**Charge: The treaty was drawn up unilaterally by the United States, without the participation of the U. S. S. R.**

*Answer:* The Soviet Union has actively, but unconstructively, participated in the treaty-making process. A year ago we gave the Soviet Union our statement of proposed treaty principles. I discussed them at length with Mr. Malik, the Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, on October 26, 1950, November 20, 1950, and January 13, 1951. He put many questions and I answered them on behalf of the United States. Two official aide memoires were exchanged between us.

The first United States draft of treaty (March, 1951) was promptly transmitted to the Soviet Union for its comments. Extensive comments were made by a Soviet note of May 7, 1951, which also at that time set forth the Soviet Union's own "proposals" for a Japanese peace treaty.<sup>1</sup> These were fully and publicly debated. The United States gave its views on May 19, 1951.<sup>2</sup> The Soviet Union then, on June 10, 1951, submitted another note rearguing its "proposals." The United States, after consulting with some others, replied on July 9, 1951.<sup>3</sup> These notes have all been made public.

Meanwhile, we gave the Soviet Union the July 3 draft of treaty with a request for its further observations. The final August 13 draft was given the Soviet Union, as in the case of other Allied Powers. The Soviet Union cannot deny "participation" in the treaty-making process except by reversing the usual sense of words.

### II

**Charge: This treaty was drafted in violation of a pledge by the United States, in the Potsdam Declaration and other international agreements, to negotiate the peace treaties, first of all, through the Council of Foreign Ministers (United States, Britain, U. S. S. R., France, and China).**

*Answer:* There was never any agreement to negotiate the Japanese peace treaty through the

Council of Foreign Ministers. The council was established on August 2, 1945, to deal with the European treaties. Japan was not mentioned. This was at the desire of the Soviet Union, which was then neutral in the Japanese war. It was provided that the council could deal with "other matters" than those mentioned, but only "by agreement between the member Governments."

The Soviet Union has persistently tried to get agreement that the Japanese peace treaty be put into the Council of Foreign Ministers; but the United States and other members, of the council have consistently refused to agree. They were unwilling to subject Japanese treaty making to the veto which the Soviet Union has in the council and which has, for 5 years, frustrated the possibilities of a German peace treaty and an Austrian treaty.

### III

**Charge: The treaty violates the 1942 declaration by the United Nations—under which each Government pledged itself "not to make a separate armistice or peace with enemies."**

*Answer:* The expressed purpose of the United Nations declaration of January 1, 1942, was to assure "complete victory." Each Government pledged itself to employ its "full resources" against those members of the Axis "with which such Government is at war" and "not to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies." That language was carefully chosen to leave the Soviet Union free as regards Japan, for the Soviet Union was not "at war" with Japan nor was Japan one of its "enemies."

The Soviet Union now claims retroactively the benefit of that declaration as regards Japan. Even if this claim is valid it does not mean that the Soviet Union can veto the proposed peace as a now prohibited "separate armistice or peace." The purpose of "complete victory" was achieved, 6 years ago. Certainly, the agreement never intended, after victory, to give each of the 47 parties a continuing, perpetual right to prevent all others from ever making peace with Japan.

An overwhelming majority of the adherents to the United Nations declaration, having won the victory over Japan to which they, but not Russia, then pledged their full resources, are about to make peace. They do so on terms which are open to all the others. They seek no special advantage

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of May 28, 1951, p. 856.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 852.

<sup>3</sup> BULLETIN of July 23, 1951, p. 143.

to themselves. If a few of the many do not care now to make peace, that is their responsibility. It will be those few who fragmentize the peace.

#### IV

**Charge:** The treaty was drawn up without the participation of Communist China, although "it is perfectly obvious that without the participation of the Chinese People's Republic in the work of preparing the peace treaty with Japan, a real peace settlement in the Far East is not possible."

**Answer:** The treaty has been drawn up with careful regard for the interests of China. The Nationalist Government has made many constructive suggestions which have been adopted. The so-called "Central People's Government" has, through the Soviet Union, been supplied with successive treaty drafts and has from time to time made public its views. These, however, have never presented a distinctive Chinese viewpoint. As stated in the note of Chou En-lai of May 22, 1951:

"After careful study of the Soviet Government's views on the United States draft peace treaty with Japan, the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China considers that the Soviet Government's views completely correspond with those of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China."

It is not true that a "real" peace in the Far East is impossible without the participation of the Communists' regime. Some, indeed would doubt that a "real" peace is possible if there is participation by a regime which the United Nations has found to be aggressor. It is true that there cannot be a "total" peace without the participation of a Chinese Government which is peacefully disposed and which has both legitimacy and power to bind all China by its ratification. Since, however, that "total" peace is not now possible, it is better to proceed, conserving every Chinese right, and giving Japan the very large measure of peace which is now possible.

#### V

**Charge:** The treaty not only fails to contain any guarantee against a revival of Japanese aggression, but fails to place any limit upon the size of Japan's future armed forces, as was done in the Italian Peace Treaty.

**Answer:** The Japanese peace treaty solemnly binds Japan not to use force against any other state. If treaty obligations are dependable, this is enough. If they are not dependable, why multiply them? Also, by the new Japanese Constitution "the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the Nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes."

Furthermore, it is contemplated that there will be a series of collective security arrangements for the Western Pacific, including Japan, which will as a practical matter, assure that Japan will not possess, for its own national account, armament which could be an offensive threat.

#### VI

**Charge:** The treaty says that Formosa and the Pescadores are to be taken from Japan, but does not specifically say that they are to go back to "China," as (according to Moscow) the Cairo Declaration promised they would. Likewise, the treaty states that Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands are to be detached from Japan, but does not state, as previously promised by the United States, that these territories should be handed over to the Soviet Union.

**Answer:** The treaty does not repeat the Cairo Declaration, which, it should be recalled, dealt not only with Formosa but with the return to China of Manchuria and with the freedom of Korea. The Soviet Union reacted violently to the suggestion that the Manchurian part of the declaration be written into the Japanese peace treaty.

As regards Formosa, the differences of opinion are such that it could not be definitively dealt with by a Japanese peace treaty to which the Allied powers, as a whole, are parties. Therefore, the treaty merely takes Japan formally out of the Formosa picture, leaving the position otherwise unchanged.

As regards South Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands, the treaty carries out the provisions of the Potsdam surrender terms, the only agreement by which Japan and the Allied powers as a whole are bound. So long as other Governments have rights under the Yalta Agreement which the Soviet Union has not fulfilled, there is at least question as to whether the Soviet Union can, with "clean hands," demand fulfillment of the parts of that agreement it likes.

#### VII

**Charge:** The United States, in opposition to its international commitments, is "restoring Japanese militarism," expanding Japan's military bases, recreating a Japanese land army and Japanese naval and air fleets, restoring and expanding the work of former Japanese military arsenals, freeing Japanese war criminals, restoring Japanese military organizations and "more and more promoting propaganda of war."

**Answer:** The allegations as to restoring militarism in Japan are totally without factual basis. Japan has been so completely disarmed that it does not as yet have an adequate police force or coast guard of its own.

#### VIII

**Charge:** Despite United States wartime statements that the United States did not want any territorial acquisitions as a result of the war, the United States is planning to maintain military bases in Japan after the war, in contravention of the Potsdam Agreement, and is, without justification, planning to maintain United States control over the Ryukyu, Bonin, Rozario, Volcano, Pares Vela and Marcus Islands.

**Answer:** The United States has told Japan that it is prepared provisionally to station some armed forces in Japan at Japan's request so that, on the

coming into force of the peace treaty, Japan will not be a total vacuum of power. The arrangement would, in essence, be comparable to those between other free countries which want to combine forces and facilities for the purposes of collective security. Such arrangements constitute an exercise of sovereignty, not a derogation of sovereignty.

As regards the Ryukyus and Bonin Islands, the treaty establishes substantially the same formula as that adopted for the Japanese mandated islands, namely U. N. trusteeship with the United States as administering authority. The Soviet Union voted for that in the case of the Japanese mandated islands. It did not consider that that involved a violation of Potsdam or "territorial aggrandizement" in violation of the Atlantic Charter. This charge can be made with even less force against the Ryukyus and Bonin treaty formula, for under it residual sovereignty remains in Japan, which was not the case with the mandated islands.

## IX

**Charge: The treaty deprives Japan of the opportunity of engaging in free and normal trade with Communist China, and denies reparations to states damaged by the Japanese during the war, although the United States has been taking reparations of its own out of Japan for six years.**

*Answer:* The treaty imposes no limitation or disabilities whatever upon Japan's future trade and Japan's economy. Whatever limitations may hereafter result will be due to circumstances which affect world trade generally, not to treaty disabilities. The treaty provides for reparation in kind to states damaged by the Japanese during the war.

As regards the alleged taking of reparations by the United States, the true fact is that, since the surrender, the United States, as occupying power, has put up 2 billion dollars for economic relief of Japan. That amount is the measure of the difference between the cost of Japan's food and raw material imports and the value of Japanese exports during the occupation period.

## United States and Japan Sign Security Treaty

[Released to the press by the U.S. delegation to the conference for conclusion and signature of Treaty of Peace with Japan September 8]

*The Governments of the United States and Japan signed a bilateral security treaty on September 8 at the presidio in a brief ceremony.*

*The treaty was signed for Japan by Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida and for the United States by Secretary Acheson, Ambassador John Foster Dulles, Senator Alexander Wiley, and Senator Styles Bridges.*

*The United States delegation, in addition to the four members who signed the treaty, included the following alternate delegates: Senators John J. Sparkman and H. Alexander Smith, and Representatives Dewey Short and Overton Brooks.*

### STATEMENTS MADE AT SIGNING CEREMONY

#### Secretary Acheson

With regard to the Security Treaty we are gathered here to sign, there are several points I should like to emphasize:

First, this treaty of security between the United States and Japan is part of a pattern for defense of peace in the Pacific area. Taken together with the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Philippines, the Tripartite Security Pact between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, and the Japanese peace treaty which we signed this morning, this action adds another link in the chain of security against aggression in a most important part of the world. These treaties constitute, in the words of President Truman, "natural initial steps in the consolidation of peace" in the Pacific area.

The signing of this Security Treaty today marks the conclusion of 10 days of historic importance to free peoples all over the world.

Second, the present treaty takes its place as a part—and an important part—of the system of security which has been developed within the framework of the United Nations Charter. The treaty is not only conceived within the spirit of the charter; it is a fulfillment of the inherent right of

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individual and collective self-defense which the charter recognizes as belonging to all sovereign nations.

Third, this Security Treaty is a voluntary arrangement between free peoples. It stems from a freely reached decision on the part of the Japanese Government and the Japanese people to seek protection for an unarmed Japan against the threat of aggression.

Fourth, there should be no misunderstanding of the purpose of this Security Treaty. Its purpose is peace. In a world in which aggression and the threat of aggression are rampant, the maintenance of peace and security requires us to take affirmative steps to bulwark freedom with military strength. Weakness is an invitation to aggression, both external and internal. We are here providing for the defensive strength without which peace would be jeopardized. In building this strength, the present treaty does not create a threat of further aggression. Of importance to all Japan's neighbors in the Pacific is the principle recognized in this treaty that Japan shall avoid any armament which could be an offensive threat or serve other than to promote peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

Fifth, the defense arrangements provided for under this treaty will constitute a shield to protect the progress being made by the Japanese people toward better conditions of life. It will give the Japanese people the opportunity to continue their constructive work of building the new peaceful Japan, free from the paralyzing threat of aggression.

Finally, this treaty expresses the mutual trust and confidence which has been growing between Japan and the United States over the past 6 years. In this time, the people of Japan have had reason to be assured as to the purposes of the United States. And we, in turn, have come to the conviction that the Japanese people want no more of the old militarism, but sincerely desire real peace. The United States believes that Japan, in the spirit of trust and confidence in which this treaty is formulated, will in due course increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against aggression and in so doing make its contribution to the collective defense of the free world.

It is with these thoughts in mind that we welcome the opportunity to sign this Security Treaty on behalf of the Government of the United States.

#### **Prime Minister Yoshida**

I am happy that this Japanese-American Security Pact has been concluded this afternoon on the heels of the signing of a Japanese peace treaty this morning.

That treaty gives Japan the key for reentering the community of nations as a sovereign equal.

This pact insures the security of the unarmed and defenseless Japan.

It has always been my conviction that Japan, once she regains liberty and independence, must assume full responsibility of safeguarding that liberty and independence. Unfortunately, we are as yet utterly unprepared for self-defense. We are very glad, therefore, that America, realizing that security of Japan means the security of the Pacific and of the world, consented to provide us the necessary protection by retaining her armed forces in and around Japan temporarily after peace so as to ward off the menace of Communist aggression which is sweeping on at this very moment close to our shores.

Restored to independence, the Japanese people will recover self-confidence as well as pride and patriotism. Our nation is now inspired with fresh vigor and zeal to shoulder their proper share in the responsibilities for the collective security of the Far East. I wish to assure the American delegates here that the Government and people of Japan will cooperate gladly and wholeheartedly in the implementation of this pact.

#### **TEXT OF THE TREATY**

Japan has signed a Treaty of Peace with the Allied Powers. On the coming into force of that Treaty, Japan will not have the effective means to exercise its inherent right of self-defense because it has been disarmed.

There is danger to Japan in this situation because irresponsible militarism has not yet been driven from the world. Therefore, Japan desires a Security Treaty with the United States of America to come into force simultaneously with the Treaty of Peace between Japan and the United States of America.

The Treaty of Peace recognizes that Japan as a sovereign nation has the right to enter into collective security arrangements, and, further, the Charter of the United Nations recognizes that all nations possess an inherent right of individual and collective self-defense.

In exercise of these rights, Japan desires, as a provisional arrangement for its defense, that the United States of America should maintain armed forces of its own in and about Japan so as to deter armed attack upon Japan.

The United States of America, in the interest of peace and security, is presently willing to maintain certain of its armed forces in and about Japan, in the expectation, however, that Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression, always avoiding any armament which could be an offensive threat or serve other than to promote peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

Accordingly, the two countries have agreed as follows:

#### **Article I**

Japan grants, and the United States of America accepts the right, upon the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace and of this Treaty, to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about Japan. Such forces may be utilized to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East and to the security of Japan against armed attack from without, including assistance given at the express request of the Japanese Government to put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through instigation or intervention by an outside Power or Powers.

## Article II

During the exercise of the right referred to in Article I, Japan will not grant, without the prior consent of the United States of America, any bases or any rights, powers or authority whatsoever, in or relating to bases or the right of garrison or of maneuver, or transit of ground, air or naval forces to any third power.

## Article III

The conditions which shall govern the disposition of armed forces of the United States of America in and about Japan shall be determined by administrative agreements between the two Governments.

## Article IV

This Treaty shall expire whenever in the opinion of the Governments of the United States of America and of Japan there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements or such alternative individual or collective security dispositions as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance by the United Nations or otherwise of international peace and security in the Japan area.

## Article V

This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and Japan and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at Washington.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

DONE in duplicate at the City of San Francisco, in the English and Japanese languages, this eighth day of September, 1951.

## NOTES EXCHANGED BY SECRETARY ACHESON AND PRIME MINISTER YOSHIDA

SEPTEMBER 8, 1951

EXCELLENCY: Upon the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace signed today, Japan will assume obligations expressed in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations which requires the giving to the United Nations of "every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter."

As we know, armed aggression has occurred in Korea, against which the United Nations and its members are taking action. There has been established a unified command of the United Nations under the United States pursuant to Security Council Resolution of July 7, 1950, and the General Assembly, by Resolution of February 1, 1951, has called upon all states and authorities to lend every assistance to the United Nations action and to refrain from giving any assistance to the aggressor. With the approval of SCAP, Japan has been and now is rendering important assistance to the United Nations action in the form of facilities and services made available to the members of the United Nations, the Armed Forces of which are participating in the United Nations action.

Since the future is unsettled and it may unhappily be that the occasion for facilities and services in Japan in support of United Nations action will continue or recur, I would appreciate confirmation, on behalf of your Government, that if and when the forces of a member or members of the United Nations are engaged in any United Nations action in the Far East after the Treaty of Peace comes into force, Japan will permit and facilitate the support in and about Japan, by the member or members, of the forces engaged in such United Nations action; the expenses involved in the use of Japanese facilities and services to be borne as at present or as otherwise mutually

agreed between Japan and the United Nations member concerned. In so far as the United States is concerned the use of facilities and services, over and above those provided to the United States pursuant to the Administrative Agreement which will implement the Security Treaty between the United States and Japan, would be at United States expense, as at present.

Accept, Excellency, the assurance of my most distinguished consideration.

His Excellency

SHIGERU YOSHIDA,

Prime Minister of Japan

[SEPTEMBER 8, 1951]

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's Note of today's date in which Your Excellency has informed me as follows:

Upon the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace signed today, Japan will assume the obligations expressed in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations which requires the giving to the United Nations of "every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter."

As we know, armed aggression has occurred in Korea, against which the United Nations and its Members are taking action. There has been established a Unified Command of the United Nations under the United States pursuant to Security Council Resolution of July 7, 1950, and the General Assembly, by Resolution of February 1, 1951, has called upon all states and authorities to lend every assistance to the United Nations action and to refrain from giving any assistance to the aggressor. With the approval of SCAP, Japan has been and now is rendering important assistance to the United Nations action in the form of facilities and services made available to the Members of the United Nations, the armed forces of which are participating in the United Nations action.

Since the future is unsettled and it may unhappily be that the occasion for facilities and services in Japan in support of the United Nations action will continue or recur, I would appreciate confirmation, on behalf of your Government, that if and when the forces of a Member or Members of the United Nations are engaged in any United Nations action in the Far East after the Treaty of Peace comes into force, Japan will permit and facilitate the support in and about Japan, by the Member or Members, of the forces engaged in such United Nations actions; the expenses involved in the use of Japanese facilities and services, over and above those provided to the Administrative Agreement which will implement the Security Treaty between the United States and Japan, would be at United States expense, as at present.

With full cognizance of the contents of Your Excellency's Note, I have the honor, on behalf of my Government, to confirm that if and when the forces of a Member or Members of the United Nations are engaged in any United Nations action in the Far East after the Treaty of Peace comes into force, Japan will permit and facilitate the support in and about Japan, by the Member or Members of the forces engaged in such United Nations action, the expenses involved in the use of Japanese facilities and services to be borne as at present or as otherwise mutually agreed between Japan and the United Nations Member concerned. In so far as the United States is concerned the use of facilities and services, over and above those provided to the United States pursuant to the Administrative Agreement which will implement the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States would be at United States expense, as at present.

Accept, Excellency, the assurance of my most distinguished consideration.

The Honorable

DEAN ACHESON,

Secretary of State

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## Azores Defense Agreement Signed With Portugal

[Released to the press September 6]

*Following is an announcement released today at Lisbon by the Portuguese Government:*

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization having indicated that the Governments of Portugal and the United States of America should enter into an agreement defining the facilities in the Azores which it is within the power of the former to grant for the purposes of the common defense and the preservation of peace and security, the two Governments have concluded a defense agreement defining these facilities, integrating them into the framework of NATO defense plans, and fixing respective obligations.

The facilities granted to the United States may eventually be extended to other members of NATO.

The agreement, which will be made public, was signed today in Lisbon by Paulo Cunha, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Portugal, and by Lincoln MacVeagh, Ambassador of the United States of America.

By virtue of this new instrument, the accord of February 2, 1948, which granted certain facilities in the Azores to the United States in relation to a military situation arising from the Second World War, ceases to have effect.

## Point Four Assists Pakistan in Locust Plague

[Released to the press August 24]

Three spraying planes, loaded aboard a DC-4 Skymaster, are scheduled to leave Idlewild International Airport, New York, on August 24, for Pakistan where they will help spread insecticide over locust-infested areas. American pilots of the spray planes left New York for Pakistan early this week.

This anti-locust campaign is being carried out under the Point Four program of technical cooperation, at the request of the Pakistan Government. Point Four is already cooperating in Pakistan in developing extension and rural welfare services to increase food production and improve living conditions in rural areas.

The anti-locust spraying operations are being carried out under contract with the Aviation International Delivery Service, a private business organization. The spraying will be directed by David R. Bump, of Springville, N. Y., who took part in exterminating the locust plague in Iran during April and May.

Ambassador Avra M. Warren will appoint a

member of his staff to cooperate with Pakistan officials in supervising the project.

Karl Knaus, agriculture extension expert from Kansas, has been in Pakistan since July 1950 as technical adviser on agriculture projects under Point Four.

According to Mr. Knaus, the locust-control work will take place in three areas of Pakistan, where the plague threatens to destroy rice, sugarcane, cotton, and wheat as well as some feed crops.

The areas where spraying operations will be carried out are in the provinces of Sind, the Punjab, and Baluchistan.

The Government of Pakistan has bought about 20 tons of Aldrin, the powerful insecticide used in similar Point Four projects in Iran and India. Spraying from planes will be supplemented by some ground control such as spreading the poison by hand. Two or three ounces of the poison, diluted in kerosene or Diesel fuel, are sufficient to spray an acre of land. Aldrin is produced by the Julius Hyman & Company of Denver, Colo., and is distributed by the Shell Oil Company.

It is expected that spraying or preliminary ground work will be under way by September first. Operations will continue for 90 days or less if the locusts are under control.

In addition to Aldrin insecticides, the Government of Pakistan is providing diluent (fuel oil), aviation fuel, bulldozers or trucks with blades attached and ground crews, and ground strips for landing small aircraft. Other items provided by Pakistan are trucks equipped with tanks and pumps, and crews for transporting and mixing insecticide and for loading airplanes. The Pakistan Government will provide food and lodging for United States personnel, tents and camp equipment, and flying, landing, hangar, and other fees for United States aircraft in Pakistan.

Under contract with the United States Government. Aviation International Delivery Service is supplying airplanes, crews, and supervisory experts as well as their transportation to Pakistan and return.

## Communiqués Regarding Korea to the Security Council

The Headquarters of the United Nations Command has transmitted communiqués regarding Korea to the Secretary-General of the United Nations under the following United Nations document numbers: S/2270, July 31; S/2289, August 10; S/2291, August 13; S/2294, August 14; S/2297, August 15; S/2299, August 16; S/2301, August 20; S/2302, August 20; S/2304, August 21; S/2305, August 21; S/2306, August 22; S/2308, August 23; S/2310, August 24.



## Land Reform Problem Challenges Free World

*Statement by Isador Lubin, U.S. Representative in the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations*<sup>1</sup>

It is now just about a year since the Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson, pointed to the use and ownership of land as an example of the kind of problem to which members of the United Nations should direct their efforts. In his address to the Fifth General Assembly, Mr. Acheson called attention to the efforts of nations in many parts of the world to achieve a better distribution of land ownership and cited recent illustrations of democratic land reform in India, in Japan, and in the Republic of Korea. These examples, he stated, "suggest what can be done on a cooperative democratic basis, by processes of peaceful change, which respect the dignity of the individual and his right to self-reliance and a decent livelihood."

The United States gave vigorous support to the resolution on land reform adopted by the General Assembly on November 20, 1950. This resolution is, in fact, the immediate reason for our discussion of land reform at this session. The United States also advocated the study of land problems in trust territories by a committee of the Trusteeship Council. More recently, on February 16, 1951, our Secretary of Agriculture, in an official statement on the long-term program of the FAO, urged greater attention to the improvement of conditions of land tenure as a vital factor in achieving increased agricultural production. FAO experience, he said, "has convinced us that production is greatest under conditions that promote the dignity and worth of the individual. We have found that in agriculture these conditions are best achieved when the individual can own the land he works, or has a security of tenure, when he can get the

productive facilities he needs, and when he can market his products at a fair return to him."

These statements and actions are not reflections of a new line of thought in the United States, but rather of one which is as old as my country. During much of the 19th Century, we were concerned with the conditions under which our new lands were opened to the public. Since then, we have been actively engaged in insuring a still wider distribution of ownership, in the reduction of tenancy, and in improving the conditions under which farm families live and work in the United States. I shall discuss some of these policies and programs later in my statement.

### Need for Land Reform

Mr. President, there are sound and pressing reasons for the practical consideration by the United Nations of problems of land reform at this time. Three-quarters of the world's entire population, and, in many countries, a still higher proportion of the people depend upon the land for their livelihood. This dependence on agriculture for their living means that their hopes for a better life are tied directly to their land problems. Yet, as we review the situation prevailing in many parts of the world, we find that systems of land ownership and other institutions that affect the working of the land are formidable barriers in many countries to higher output and to higher standards of living. In vast areas of Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa, where upwards of 70 percent of the people live on the land and obtain their livelihood from farming, substantial progress towards greater output and higher standards of living depends upon the de-

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Economic and Social Council at Geneva on Sept. 3 and released to the press by the U. S. Mission to the U. N. on the same date.

velopment of sound and effective rural institutions. This has been emphasized over and over again in the debates of this Council on the economic development of underdeveloped countries.

In some of these areas, small farmers, sharecroppers, tenants, and farm laborers are held in the bonds of systems of land tenure that deny justice and impede progress. In many countries of these areas, as the Secretary-General's Report shows, interest rates paid by those who work the land are usurious, and even confiscatory, ranging from 20 percent to 100 percent a year. Rental charges range up to 75 percent to 80 percent of the annual crops. Many other types of inequities exist.

Conditions such as these inevitably crush the hopes for economic betterment of those who work the land. If widespread aspirations for economic and social improvement are to be satisfied, if incentives are to be offered for increased output on the part of each individual worker on the land, there must be very real improvement in economic and, often, in social institutions. And, if this improvement is to be effective and lasting, it must spring from the peoples concerned and be accomplished largely by their governments.

#### **Scope of Land Reform**

It is clear from the excellent and well-balanced report by the Secretary-General, that the problem of improving agricultural institutions has many facets. It is not simply a matter of transferring land from those who own it and do not work it to those who work the land but do not own it. To be sure, in some areas this is a major aspect of the problem. However, even where conditions of tenure, as such, pose no important problem, there is often need for land reform.

The small farmer who owns his land, but cannot extricate himself from perpetual debt to the money lender is in nearly as precarious a position as the landless farmer. So too is the land owner who is engaged in continuous dispute because the title to his land is unclear. Equally precarious is the lot of the farmer who is unable to obtain credit on reasonable terms or the farmer whose tax burden bears no relation to his ability to pay taxes.

Nor is land reform by any means always a matter of breaking up large estates. Quite as often, it is a problem of consolidating small and uneconomical holdings. The old system of strip farming, which many of us have seen on our travels in parts of Europe, is an example. Here the farmers' plots are so widely scattered that he cannot operate them effectively, but must work them by hand, without the use of machinery, and must waste endless hours in unproductive travel from one to the other.

In some countries, where farm laborers are employed on large holdings, their economic and so-

cial conditions are sometimes so bad as to make the problem of bettering their lot properly part of the broad question of land reform.

Thus, land reform is a multitude of things. Basically, however, land reform comprises improvement in all the social and economic institutions surrounding farm life. It embraces the redistribution or consolidation of holdings into plots of efficient size, the reduction of exorbitant rental charges, security of tenure for the tenant, the improvement of working conditions for farm laborers. It embraces the settlement of title to water and land. It embraces reform of the tax system, measures to assure agricultural credit on reasonable terms, and the establishment of rural industries. It also involves the establishment of cooperative societies for common purchase, marketing and credit. In short, land reform means a positive program for more effective use of the land for the benefit of the agricultural population.

The many-sided approach that is required in dealing with land reform is already brought out by the Secretary-General's Report.<sup>2</sup> This report makes it evident that a wide and just distribution of land must be accompanied by other closely coordinated programs, often simultaneously effected, for tax reform, adequate credit systems, legislation to further cooperation and technical guidance, as well as by programs of health, sanitation, and education. Conversely, without appropriate changes in land tenure, these other efforts to increase investments and output from the land are often likely to remain ineffective.

#### **Promotes Stability, Peace**

But land reform is important not only because of its potential effect on incentives to production. It has a far larger significance. It can mean the difference between explosive tensions and stability, between apathy and hope, between serfdom and citizenship. A nation of farm owners and of tenants who have the opportunity to become farm owners has the basic elements of a stable society. The farmer who owns his land, who retains an equitable share of his production, who is able to combine in voluntary associations with his neighbors to improve their common lot, knows the meaning of human dignity. He has a stake in his community. A nation of insecure tenants and rootless laborers, who see little hope to better their lot, is an unstable society, subject to sporadic violence and easily persuaded to follow false leaders.

For these reasons, in our opinion, land reform should be one of the basic programs of the United Nations. Certainly, it is basic in the thinking of the American people.

We in the United States recognize that the

<sup>2</sup> Land Reform: Defects in Agrarian Structure as Obstacles to Economic Development. Report by the Secretary-General under General Assembly Resolution 401 (V), U.N. doc. E/2003, June 14, 1951.

attainment of peace and stability depends to a considerable degree on immediate and positive steps to correct systems of land tenure which exploit the workers on the land, steps which will remove inequitable taxes on farm lands and agricultural products, eliminate unreasonably high rents and exorbitant interest rates on farm loans. We are of the firm conviction that peace and stability in many parts of the world will require the elimination of those economic and social practices which work extreme hardship on rural people.

#### Basic U. S. Attitudes

As I have said, there is nothing new about the adherence of the United States to the principles of economic and social justice in land tenure. It is as old as the American Republic itself. It is a basic part of the fabric out of which our nation was created, a fabric with which the United States has grown and prospered.

In the United States, it has always been our belief that the man who tills the soil should own it. This ideal is part of the American heritage. It has remained embedded in our laws and customs ever since the American Revolution.

What is new is our growing realization of the fundamental importance that such principles should occupy in our foreign policies. What is new is our determination to place increasing emphasis upon international programs which are designed through the attainment of greater economic and social stability to give effect to such principles as positive weapons of peace.

Our conviction that land ownership is important to a stable society has been given expression through positive action from the earliest days of our national existence. Our policy has always been that, in the national interest, the maximum amount of public lands should be opened up for ownership by as many private individuals as possible and that good farm land should not be reserved for a favored few.

With this policy as our guide, the free lands of our great West were settled by hardy pioneers under the Homestead laws. Under these laws, private individuals were enabled to obtain title to a quarter-section of land, that is, to 160 acres, merely by staking a claim, building a house, and living on the land and working it for a year or more. This is, in part, the historical basis for the fact that in the United States over 70 percent of our farms in 1948 were operated by their owners. In many of our States an even larger percentage of our farms were so operated. For example, 89 percent are so operated on the Pacific Coast. In 1945, the most recent year for which complete data are available, over 85 percent of the total farm land in the United States was owned by individuals and only 5.6 percent by corporations. In 34 of our states, over 90 percent of the farm land is owned by individuals.

Once our rural areas were settled, we in the United States were faced with the problem of keeping the farm land in the hands of those who worked it. We were also faced with problems of increasing tenancy, particularly in those areas of our country which had been settled early in our history. To deal with these problems we undertook, particularly after 1920, a variety of measures, including extension of various types of credit and such programs as soil conservation, crop insurance, reclamation, and other aids to farmers.

#### Experience in the United States

For example, in recent years, my Government has supplied direct long-term, low-interest credit or has insured private loans to nearly two million American farm families who did not otherwise have adequate sources of credit. Many thousands of these loans have been made to tenants and farm laborers, so that they could become farm owners. Production credit is also regularly made available under government auspices through cooperative associations, as well as by private lending organizations, to farm families who want to improve their farms or to buy machinery, as well as to others who are beginning to operate new farms in areas opened up by government reclamation programs.

The United States Government also provides so-called "disaster" loans to enable a farmer whose crop is lost by drought, or freeze or flood to hold his farm through the disaster period. Our Government also shares with the farmer the cost of conserving the soil. It finances agricultural research and extension services so that all farmers, little as well as big, can be well informed on scientific techniques of good farming.

Thus, our goal within the United States remains now, as in the days of Thomas Jefferson, to increase the number of farmer-owners of family-size farms. Our objective also is to enable those farmers to enjoy the advantages of large-scale operation by working with their neighbors in genuine voluntary cooperatives to purchase land and machinery, to market their products, and to secure credit on reasonable terms.

Our progress towards this goal is evidenced in our national experience during the last several decades. According to the 1935 census, 42 percent of the land-operators in the United States were tenants, paying rent or working for a share of the crop. The last complete agricultural census available in the United States was taken in 1945. During the short period of ten years, the national percentage of farm tenancy had been reduced from 42 percent to 31.7 percent. It is estimated that by 1950 a further reduction of some 5 percent took place. As of today, the proportion of farms operated by tenants in the United States is estimated to be about 26 percent. As to share croppers, their number in 1930 amounted to 776,000. By 1945, this number had dropped to 447,000, or less



than 8 percent of all farmers in the United States.

#### **Family-Size Farms**

I have referred earlier to our policy of promoting ownerships of family-size farms. May I take a moment to explain what we mean when we speak of the family-size farm. As we use the term in the United States, the family-size farm is a farm of the size necessary to maintain a family at a fair living standard, and which can be operated by the farmer and his family either alone or with the help of one or two "hired men" who are usually regarded as part of the family group. These farms, of course, vary greatly in size. In the rich valleys of California, 5 acres may be large enough for a lettuce grower; in our Pacific Northwest, 10 acres may be sufficient for the producer of strawberries. In Iowa's rich cornland, 160 acres may be a desirable size. To raise beef cattle on the ranges of our Southwest, 1,000 acres is necessary. There is no fixed rule. We recognize, as all students of agriculture must do, that solutions to the problems of land holding and land use will vary with the crop raised, the climate, the availability of water, the existing state of agricultural science, the training of the farmers, and with the social institutions of the country.

It is clear that there is no ready-made and easy formula which will solve all land problems. Our whole experience tends to suggest, instead, that each problem requires its own specific solution. In one way or another, however, we in the United States have faced many of these problems. In countries where there are major land problems, some of our experiences in the United States may prove helpful. We recognize, of course, that the programs developed to answer our needs cannot be automatically applied elsewhere. It is our hope that as a result of discussions in this Council suggestions will come forth which will make constructive contributions towards the solution of the land problem.

But one thing is clear to us from our experience: To be successful, a program of land reform requires a conviction not only among people who live on the land but also among the public officials, and national leaders, of the need both to adopt consistent long-range land policies and to undertake programs necessary to sustain such policies year after year.

Now, if I may turn to the international aspects of the policy of the United States in this field—wherever the United States has had an opportunity to support land reform in other countries, we have done so. I might cite the successful land reform activities in Japan after the war.

#### **Land Reform in Japan**

Certain aspects of the land tenure system in Japan prior to World War II were highly un-

democratic and were a source of much social unrest. This unrest was exploited by the Japanese militarists in gaining support for their vast military adventures. Moreover, the prewar Japanese Government's reaction to general agrarian distress was one of evasion, outright neglect, suppression of protest movements and of half-hearted measures to placate the farmers. Consequently, land tenure reform became one of the principal objectives of the Allied Occupation. It was the determined policy of the Allied Occupation to encourage the new Government of Japan to initiate fundamental land reform measures.

The result was that legislation was enacted in October 1946 requiring that virtually all agricultural land in Japan owned by absentee landlords be purchased at fixed prices—not confiscated—by the Government and sold to tenants. Terms of sale were fixed at a level within the means of tenants to purchase land. Landlords residing on the land were permitted to retain small acreages.

Actual operations of the Japanese land reform program began about January 1947. Within two years the transfer of land from landlords to tenants had completely reorganized the pattern of land ownership and of landlord-tenant relations. In a program characterized by orderly progress, almost entirely without violence, about one-third of the total cultivated land of Japan passed into the hands of more than three million working cultivators. The amount of land operated by tenants had shrunk from 46 percent to about 12 percent of the total cultivated area. Absentee landlords as a class disappeared. Land owners who, prior to reform, constituted only 36 percent of the total number of cultivators had increased to 70 percent. Tenants, who before the reform represented 27 percent of all cultivators, now represent less than 6 percent. Such tenant-landlord agreements as are in effect are subject to strict government regulation. These accomplishments, which had materialized by early 1949, mark the end of the land tenancy system which existed in Japan since 1868.

#### **Accomplished in Two Years**

As I have said, this reform was accomplished in a little more than two years. It was achieved without interrupting farm operations or the lives of farm people.

The Japanese land reform program was neither an adventure in utopian idealism nor a phase of social revolution. It was a hard-headed program designed to relieve farmers of the burden of an oppressive landlord system, a landlord system which had fostered antidemocratic social relations and had been a hindrance to increased agricultural production.

The three million farmers who have acquired land under the land reform program in Japan have a new stake in their communities. The role of the Government was one of over-all guidance and

administration of the transfer program. The Government did not become a land owner, nor did it obtain rights which amounted to ownership. There has been no collectivization of land under which the cultivator is in fact converted into a worker in the employ of the state.

Throughout all phases of the program, stress was placed on the establishment and preservation of the family farm. Over the centuries the aspirations of Japanese farmers have been directed toward acquisition of individual farm units. The land reform program gave effect to these aspirations. Here was a demonstration that thoroughgoing land reform is possible under present day conditions without accompanying widespread violence.

### **Paraguay's Experience**

To cite one more example, in a cooperative venture with the Government of Paraguay we have been able to offer some assistance through our Institute for Inter-American Affairs, in a resettlement project which may eventually affect 100,000 families. The Bank of Paraguay is providing the financing for the project. The Institute, through a cooperative agency known as the Servicio, provides the experts, the demonstration equipment and the necessary training of the colonists. Colonization began in 1946 with 57 families on a pilot colony near Asunción. The Servicio showed the colonists how to lay out their land in cash crops, in pasturage for work animals and a cow or two, and in vegetable gardens to raise their own food.

With the lessons learned at the pilot colony, the Government, 2 years ago, laid out and colonized under Servicio guidance 78,000 acres in the farm region near the country's southern border. With their families, 570 virtually penniless men—chosen by committees of neighbors who could vouch for their character and industry, since none of them had credit ratings—were settled at this colony.

The Bank of Paraguay financed the construction of their houses, the purchase of farm machinery and a cow. It then gave them enough cash to live on until the first harvest. They have 10 years to pay for the land, five years for the machinery and animals. Credit supervisors confer with the colonists at the start of the crop year, help them decide what and how much to plant, and see to it that enough cash crops are set out to take care of the annual payment to the bank and yet leave sufficient cash for family needs. Bank collections are running over 90 percent—a good record in any country. So successful has the colony proved, that Paraguay is laying out two more huge colonies to settle some 100,000 farm families.

Mr. President, where circumstances have enabled the United States to support, encourage, and

assist land reform programs, it has done so. It will, upon request of the country seeking our assistance, continue to do so as part of its programs of technical and economic assistance to other countries. We have provided and will continue to provide technical aid to help meet problems of social and economic organization, as well as problems of a narrower technological nature. We have provided and will continue to provide technical and financial aid for reclamation, irrigation, and drainage projects to enlarge the total area of arable land. We have provided and will continue to provide technical and financial aid to support industrialization and diversification of economic activity so that the surplus rural population pressing on the land can find alternative productive employment. We shall take every opportunity to support and encourage desirable land reform programs through all appropriate international agencies.

### **Reforms Must Fit Indigenous Cultures**

I wish to make it clear, Mr. President, that in standing ready to assist other countries to solve their problems in this field, the United States is not advocating any particular form of land tenure. We are perfectly aware that forms of land holding vary widely in different parts of the world. They are often aspects of the indigenous culture. These cultures must be understood. They must be respected. For this reason, land reform should be considered in terms of its objectives, rather than in terms of any legal framework.

I also want to make one other important point. We do not conceive of land reform in narrow, punitive terms, implying the objective of simply turning out one set of owners in favor of another. Such a concept would, we feel, miss the point entirely, that is, the advancement of the general welfare of rural populations through democratic institutions.

Nor do we conceive of land reform as the cutting up of large estates and even relatively small farms into small tracts and turning them over to new so-called "owners" who are then given crop-delivery quotas which are above their capacity to meet. Such a process gives an excuse for government charges that "since the new proprietors have failed to operate in conformity with the need of the State" the land will have to be taken over by the Government. Under such systems of land reform, which have been all too prevalent in certain countries in recent years, people who thought they had become owners of their own farms have in fact found themselves merely workers on collective or state farms.

### **Secretary-General's Report**

I should now like to return to the Report of the Secretary-General and to comment on some of the questions which it raises. It concludes that,



for many countries, the agrarian structure, and in particular the system of land tenure, prevents a rise in the standard of living of small farmers and agricultural laborers and impedes economic development. While we do not subscribe to all of the observations of the report on land reform or accept it as an adequate treatment of the subject, we certainly endorse its conclusion as to the need for land reform as a means of promoting economic development.

While we believe that ownership is a very desirable objective, we agree with the finding of the Secretary-General that tenants can have security without ownership where rents are not excessive and where security of tenure is safeguarded by legislation. There is need, therefore, for legislation to prevent the charge of exorbitant rentals on agricultural land and to assure the cultivator security of tenure.

There is need, also, for legislation insuring satisfactory working conditions for farm laborers employed on large farm units. For some types of farming, where large capital is required, large ranches or haciendas are desirable and indeed necessary. It should be noted that the ILO is already concerned with the problem of improving the conditions of work of agricultural workers.

As the Report points out, land reform does not merely mean the fragmentation of land holdings. Indeed, in some instances it may mean the reverse. For breaking tracts of land up into very small holdings often prevents rational cultivation, particularly when numerous plots are scattered over a wide area. We are pleased to note that several countries, such as Jordan, Lebanon, and India, have made effective efforts toward the consolidation of fragmented land holdings.

We note also the importance which the Secretary-General's report places on the problem of insuring clear title to land. The land of such title leads to continuous disputes, perpetuates insecurity, encourages the waste of land, water and manpower. It is frequently a factor in preventing the cultivator from getting access to credit on reasonable terms. To resolve this problem the status of land ownership should be clarified, and procedures and facilities for surveying land and for establishing and registering title to land should be expanded and improved, thereby enabling the cultivator-owner to secure evidence of ownership rights with a minimum of delay.

As the Secretary-General points out, fiscal reform is also an important element in the promotion of land reform, particularly in situations where an inequitable burden of taxation is borne by the cultivator of land. In this connection, it might be mentioned that better tax administration would, by itself, remove some of the inequities of existing tax systems.

Another serious problem closely related to land reform is the lack of adequate credit facilities. All too often, credit is either lacking, or available

only at excessive rates of interest. If land reform is to proceed, credit must be made available to the small farmer at reasonable rates, preferably at the village or local level. Full advantage should, of course, be taken of existing public and private credit facilities. At the same time, the farmer needs guidance as to the best methods of using credit and of marketing his produce.

Toward this end, the promotion of cooperatives is an important element in any program of land reform. Cooperatives, however, should be genuinely voluntary, organized for the purpose of enabling farmer members to benefit from new developments in techniques of production, large-scale purchasing and marketing, and credit facilities. Not only will voluntary cooperatives lead to greater financial returns to farmers, but we believe that, as a result of experience in the democratic process of managing common problems at the local level, they may prove beneficial in developing a social consciousness and responsibility among the participating farmers.

As the Secretary-General's Report indicates, much has already been done to overcome defects in land use and land policy in various parts of the world. And much of the change that has taken place has been accomplished within the framework of orderly democratic processes. However, much still remains to be done.

#### **The Task of the United Nations**

Mr. President, we have at hand a very large body of experience in the field of land reform. We have, among our many member countries, expert personnel who have developed great ingenuity in meeting the land problems of their particular areas.

The task of the United Nations is to mobilize these skills and experience.

The task of the United Nations and of this Council is to focus world attention on land practices which keep millions of farmers and farm workers laboring on an economic and social treadmill.

The task of the United Nations is to use the machinery of international organization to speed the removal of obstacles in the path to economic and social well-being.

Our principal tools in resolving this problem are the experienced personnel of the United Nations and the specialized agencies, particularly as they are brought together in a functioning unit under the expanded program for technical assistance.

The extent to which those tools will be used must always depend upon the extent to which the governments of the countries in which land reform is required want to use them. These governments have it within their power to frustrate land reform and perpetuate ancient practices. Or they can choose to utilize the experience which the



United Nations system can provide and hasten the day when the men and women who till the soil can see their daily lot improved in the form of more food, better clothing, greater understanding and better health.

#### **U. S. Resolution**

The United States Delegation has submitted a resolution, as a basis for discussion, which we hope will provide for the continuing mobilization of our united efforts.<sup>3</sup> It is based on the promise that the major effort in modernizing land practices must spring from governments themselves, and on the further premise that the United Nations system can and must play a major role in assisting governments to achieve these aims.

I will not undertake to describe the resolution in detail at this time. In general, it encourages governments to take such measures as may be required to provide, among other things, security of land tenure for the man who cultivates the fields; to promote, where advantageous, the operation of agriculture on the basis of the family-sized farm; to establish and improve national and local agricultural credit facilities; to prevent exorbitant land rentals and inequitable land taxes; to promote, where feasible and appropriate, cooperative organizations which might aid in farm purchasing, financing, marketing and processing; to encourage rural industries so as to utilize rural manpower more efficiently.

It recommends the extension of such measures to non-self-governing territories.

It recommends also that the specialized agencies, particularly the FAO, ILO and UNESCO, join forces through the technical assistance program to meet the needs of the various governments as they tackle their land problems.

#### **"Matter of Continuous Concern"**

It is our hope that the problem of land reform with all its ramifications will be a matter of continuous concern to the Council. To that end the resolution requests the specialized agencies concerned to report to the Council annually, if possible, and at least every two years, on the status of the land problem in their respective fields. It asks the Secretary-General in turn to provide the Council with a summary analysis and synthesis of these reports to assist us in reviewing the problem.

Mr. President, as I have indicated, the people of the United States are concerned with land reform for many reasons. We are concerned with it because it affects immediately and directly the productivity of the farmer, and this productivity has an important effect on economic development. We are concerned with land reform because it

<sup>3</sup>For text of the United States Draft Resolution on Land Reform submitted in the Thirteenth Session of Economic and Social Council, Geneva, Sept. 3, 1951, see U. N. Doc. US/E/285, Sept. 5, 1951.

affects immediately and directly the well-being of the farmer, and the farmer is, after all, more than half of the world's working population. We are concerned with land reform because we are concerned with human dignity, with social justice, and with the easing of social and political tensions that spill over into destructive violence.

And, we, in the United States, are concerned with land reform for another and quite simple reason. We have not yet completely solved our own land problems. We have our own problems of tenancy, of land distribution, and of migratory labor. Although the situation is rapidly improving, as I have already indicated, the problem in the United States is by no means yet solved.

#### **"One of Greatest Challenges"**

The need for truly democratic solutions of the grave problems in this field, with which the Council and other organs of the United Nations are coming to grips, must be evident to all of us. It is one of the greatest challenges to the free world today. In their broadest aspect, these are not merely problems which relate to the level of agricultural production, or to the terms and conditions of tenancy, important though these questions may be. Rather, they are problems which bear directly and profoundly upon ultimate goals of human welfare, goals that have been adopted by the United Nations as its own objectives. In assisting in the pursuit of these objectives, through the United Nations and otherwise, the well-being of peoples who derive their living from the land will continue to be of major concern to the United States. We shall continue to give encouragement and assistance to land reform programs, whenever and wherever these will substantially contribute to promoting the basic objectives of stability and well-being.

#### **Text of Resolution**

*[Printed from telegraphic text]*

*The following resolution was adopted at a plenary session of the Economic and Social Council at Geneva on September 7:*

The Economic and Social Council,  
HAVING EXAMINED the report prepared in pursuance of the General Assembly resolution 401 (V) by the Secretary-General, prepared in cooperation with the Food and Agriculture Organization on "defects in agrarian structure as obstacles to economic developments," the report of the Economic Employment and Development Commission which points out the need for land reform as an aid to economic development, and the report of the council of FAO; and,

NOTING the work done by the International Labor Organization in the field of agricultural labor and that a study on rural economic development in trust territories has been undertaken by the Trusteeship Council,  
BEARING in mind the importance of improving the conditions of agricultural workers, tenants, small and medium farmers to economic development and rising standards of living, human dignity and freedom, and social and political stability;

FURTHER BEARING in mind the main conclusions of the Secretary-General's report namely,

(I) That in view of the great diversity of conditions in underdeveloped territories in various parts of the world no one special measure or group of measures can be expected to meet all situations,

(II) That any measures taken to improve agrarian conditions should be related to general plans for promoting economic development;

RECOGNIZING that appropriate measures of land reform designed to achieve improvement of the conditions of agricultural populations and an increase in agricultural production must in many countries be regarded as a necessary part of any effective implementation of comprehensive programmes for economic development.

RECOGNIZING, further, that especially in cases where the fundamental problem is that of a surplus rural population as compared with the cultivable area, the problem calls for diversification of activities and the establishment of industries, in conjunction with the measures recommended hereafter.

1. *Urges* all governments confronted with the problem of agrarian structure to study the Secretary-General's report in order to take full account of the experiences of others in carrying out their own plans for economic development.

2. *Recommends* that governments institute appropriate land reform in the interest of landless, small and medium farmers.

3. *Recommends* further that governments take such of the following measures as may be appropriate to the circumstances in their countries to:

A. *Assure* security of tenure to the cultivator of land so that he may have the incentive to improve the productivity of the land and to conserve its resources, and the opportunity to retain an equitable share of his production;

B. *Provide* opportunity for the cultivator to acquire ownership of land;

C. *Promote* the organization of land holdings into farms of an efficient size, either by dividing unduly large holdings or by combining fragmented units, as may be required, wherever this may be economically and socially advantageous to the population;

D. *Establish* on undeveloped and newly reclaimed lands secure and equitable tenure conditions, including opportunity for ownership in family sized holdings;

E. *Establish* or expand national and local institutions for providing agricultural credit at reasonable rates of interest, and take legislative or administrative measures to assist in the reduction of agricultural indebtedness;

F. *Enact* and enforce legislation which will prevent the charge of exorbitant rentals on agricultural land;

G. *Review* their tax structure and administration with a view to eliminating inequitable tax loads and related charges on the cultivator of land;

H. *Promote* cooperative organizations for the cultivation, marketing and processing of agricultural products and for the purchase of farm supplies and equipment;

I. *Encourage* diversification of agricultural production wherever this can help raise the living standards of the farm and nonfarm populations;

J. *Take* steps directed toward rational diversification of their economies so that agricultural developments may proceed as part of an integrated programme of economic developments;

K. *Encourage* the establishment of industries in rural areas, including cooperatives, small scale and cottage industries, and especially industries using indigenous agricultural products as their raw material, and thus assure such industries a place in the economic life of the country;

L. *Establish* or expand, either through cooperative organizations or by other means appropriate to the economy of the country, factories or work shops for the manufacture, maintenance, repair and servicing of the most essential agricultural machinery and the storage of spare parts;

M. *Expand* and develop programmes of literacy and general education in rural areas;

N. *Ensure* that adequate agricultural research, through governmental services or otherwise, is undertaken;

O. *Establish* or expand services for the education of the farmer in the technological and economic aspects of agricultural and rural life through such measures as agricultural extension services and model farms;

P. *Improve* the economic, social and legal status of agricultural wage laborers on plantations and other large estates.

4. *Recommends* that all governments responsible for populations which are not economically advanced, including those governments responsible for the administration of non-self-governing territories, in addition to taking such of the measures described above as may be required, should ensure that the interests of such populations are fully protected in policies and laws relating to the transfer of land.

5. *Recommends* that the specialized agencies, each in its respective field, particularly the FAO, ILO, and UNESCO should in cooperation with the United Nations, keep the subject of land reform under review and give high priority to this problem in their technical assistance programs, bearing in mind the resolution of the Technical Assistance Committee adopted at its 19th meeting, dealing with the provision of supplies and equipment, and specifically:

A. *Focus attention* on the urgent need for land reforms in many areas;

B. *Consider* affording high degree of priority to the recruitment of professional staff competent to advise governments on problems of land reform and draw the attention of member governments to methods of solving such problems which have proved successful in other countries;

C. *Place particular emphasis* on furnishing assistance to governments wishing to adopt domestic measures which would contribute to land reforms particularly:

(1) The development of legislation relating to land tenure, settlement of titles, conditions of tenancy, problems of size and organization of land holdings, settlement of publicly owned land, and financing of the redistribution of land;

(2) The development and extension of agricultural credit;

(3) The development and extension of cooperative organizations for essential agricultural services such as financing, marketing, processing of agricultural products and purchase of farm implements and supplies;

(4) The promotion of agricultural extension services;

(5) The establishment of rural industry;

(6) The development of programmes for improvement of agricultural labor standards and security of employment;

(7) The expansion of programmes for training of teachers and educational leaders in techniques of mass education, especially in rural areas.

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in cooperation with the appropriate specialized agencies, to assist governments, on their request, with respect to activities that fall outside of the field of any specialized agency and, in particular, with respect to measures to improve their fiscal systems, with special reference to measures designed to prevent the imposition of inequitable taxes and other assessments and fees on the cultivator of land;

7. *Requests* the specialized agencies concerned, in their respective fields of responsibility to include in their annual reports to the council information on their activities pursuant to recommendation in paragraph 3 above;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General periodically, but at least once every 3 years, to arrange in cooperation with the specialized agencies concerned, to obtain by means of a single questionnaire addressed to governments information on progress in land reforms including legislation and other measures adopted, on any obstacles to the adoption of such measures and any suggestions that governments may have concerning international action to promote land reforms and to analyse the information received and to present conclusions and recommendations to the council; and

9. *Draws the attention* of the governments concerned to the possibilities offered by the system of free and voluntary cooperation on the part of farmers with a view to meeting the requirements of technical and economic progress in agriculture, while preserving the rights and freedoms of the individual.

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in cooperation with the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Labor Organization and the other competent specialized

agencies, to prepare a report for a future session of the council, summarizing the results obtained in various countries through agricultural cooperation and bringing out the possibilities offered from every standpoint by the cooperative system in this field.

11. *Recommends* that the General Assembly consider this subject from time to time in order that all member governments may have an opportunity to take part in the discussion of developments in this field.

## ECOSOC Meeting Seeks Solution of Hemisphere Economic Problems

*Edward G. Miller, Jr.*

*Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

The United States delegation is especially grateful for the opportunity which this plenary session affords to comment on the work of the second extraordinary session of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council as it has thus far developed. First of all I would like to express my deep gratification over the splendid spirit of cooperation shown by all the delegations present at this meeting and over the conscientious effort that each of them has put forth to find solutions for the problems that have been discussed here and which are of such vital importance to all our economies. The unanimity of purpose shown at this meeting is in keeping with the highest tradition of inter-American friendship and solidarity. This plenary session, in the opinion of the United States delegation, appears especially opportune in view of the fact that the Council is about to begin consideration of its work program for the year 1951-52. The United States delegation believes that the work program is one of the most important items of the agenda because of the decisive role the Council is called upon to play during these critical times. Therefore the United States delegation would like, with your kind indulgence, to set forth at this time its views on this important topic. In doing so, I would also like to make a few comments upon the highly purposeful deliberations that have taken place to date.

### Inflation Control

We are now in the midst of a collective defense effort which is bringing, as a consequence, eco-

nomie dislocations of varying degrees of severity to the economies of all the countries of the world. The Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Washington this year was called in order to develop a united front before some of the problems arising as a result of the Korean war. That Meeting entrusted to the Council in Resolution XVII certain specific continuing duties with regard to the control of inflation in the defense of the economies of the American nations. Certain aspects of those problems have, since the Meeting of Ministers, been under discussion in the ordinary sessions of the Council as well as in this extraordinary session. We have all learned much from these deliberations. With respect to the problem of inflation control the Council can exercise a dynamic role and I am confident that as a result of the deliberations of this extraordinary session the Council will develop an even more positive program to meet the problem in the emergency and post emergency period.

This session has been characterized by great preoccupation over the problem of maintaining the purchasing power of monetary reserves. The United States delegation is entirely sympathetic with the preoccupations of the other nations of the hemisphere in regard to this problem. We will be glad to participate with complete sincerity in any continuing studies that the Council may pursue. However, in all frankness, we should point out once more that the problem of monetary reserves appears to be only one aspect of the much greater problem which confronts us all, namely, that of the economic and financial disequilibrium which has been forced upon us collectively by the present grave threat to our security. Without wishing to belittle the importance of the problem, I believe that as it has developed thus far in the emergency, it is far more theoretical than real.

<sup>1</sup> Made before plenary session of the Second Meeting of the Inter-American Ecosoc at Panama City, Panama, on Aug. 28 and released to the press on the same date.



This is because of the fact that the United States and other traditional suppliers, particularly Europe, have been able to continue to the other countries of the hemisphere a far greater flow of goods than had been anticipated.

In the second place, it seems to us that any study of this specific aspect of the disequilibrium brought about by the emergency should be carried out in the light of the many other factors created by the present emergency and by the last devastating war which affected all of the nations here present. It seems only fair to the other members here present that I should bring to mind some of the realities of the situation as they might be considered by the people and particularly by the Congress of the United States. These realities include the fact that the United States came out of World War II with a national debt of more than 250 billion dollars and with large continuing financial responsibilities caused by the war, and that the current emergency is requiring very considerable financial and economic sacrifices on the part of the American people as well as the sacrifices of life. These are sacrifices which we believe you will agree are being undertaken not in our own national interest alone but in the interest of the collective cause of peace and security, to which we have all pledged our mutual cooperation. Consequently, without in any sense detracting from the importance which many of the other nations here present attach to the problem of monetary reserves, I reiterate the suggestion that any future consideration of this or any other aspect of emergency inflation and financial problems be carried out in the light of the total emergency situation which we collectively confront.

#### Supply and Production Problems

One of the most constructive aspects of the work of this Conference has been the full and frank discussion which has transpired of our mutual problems and preoccupations in certain aspects of the supply situation. Those countries which are not individually represented on the International Materials Conference (Imc), and its constituent committees, have had an ample opportunity to express their concern and their views over the work of this organization and its possible impact upon their economies. I believe that a far better understanding has been brought about as a result of the discussions that have taken place here. As a representative of one of the important member nations in the Imc, I reiterate our pledge that in our participation in the work of the Imc our Government will do everything possible to safeguard the interests of each and every nation here represented.

The work of Committee II has also given us an opportunity to examine our bilateral supply relationships, particularly insofar as the United States is concerned as a supplying nation, and I

believe that in the discussions which have taken place the United States delegation has been able to demonstrate that the United States is fully living up to its commitments under Resolution XVI of the Foreign Ministers Meeting. We have welcomed the opportunity as one member of a community of nations to render accounts to the other members, and I can only express the hope that any government which ever entertains a doubt as to the fairness of the treatment of its requirements will feel free at any time to come to us in Washington for a full and frank discussion. In this regard I cannot stress too strongly the need for governments to justify their requirements with complete and specific statistical data.

The work of Committee II has disclosed a great interest in the possible contribution of the study groups in sulphur, tinplate, and newsprint which are being set up by the Council in Washington. It is our view that once these study groups are created, the member nations must contribute effectively to their daily operations so that they make the maximum contribution to solving the difficult problems which resulted in their creation. I trust the member governments will realize the importance of assigning technically qualified representatives to those groups. On our part we intend to support fully the work of these study groups.

In addition to those aspects of our mutual supply problems which have been fully thrashed out at this Conference, there are two other problems in the supply field which occupied an important position in the work of the Foreign Ministers and which perhaps have not received as much attention in the Council as they deserve.

#### STRATEGIC MATERIALS

Resolution XIII of the meeting adopted all feasible measures for increasing the production of strategic materials. In our view the Council can render an important service in effectuating the purpose of this transcendental resolution. In discussing this question of strategic materials, we do not refer to any single country since this is an indivisible problem and concerted action is required to achieve the desired result. However, it appears to us that in the light of the present emergency and the drastic shortages which occur in regard to many critical materials, the Council might well undertake certain continuing duties during the emergency period to expedite the production and delivery in the most effective manner of these materials. We should like to point out that shortages of these strategic materials in many cases not only hinder the defense program but also limit the ability of the United States to supply important manufactured goods to other countries of the hemisphere. Specific commodities which come to mind as I say this include iron, manganese, tungsten, beryl, copper, petroleum, and many others. Would it not be possible for

the Council to devote itself in cooperation with the member governments to elaborating individual country programs for the purpose of stimulating the production and delivery of strategic materials? We have strongly supported the Bolivian proposal that the Council concern itself with the investigation and exploration of mineral resources. I should point out that the United States under its technical cooperation programs has for the last 10 years been cooperating on a bilateral basis with other countries of the hemisphere in this very field. In our current request to Congress for additional funds under the Point Four Program, we have requested greatly increased funds for this very purpose.

In making these suggestions we are motivated not only by the needs of the collective defense effort, but also by the conviction that a well-conceived program of development of strategic materials will help to realize the often repeated aspirations of the producing countries to achieve higher levels of economic activity.

#### **ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT**

Naturally the great continuing preoccupation of the nations of Latin America is with regard to the development of their internal economies. At the Foreign Ministers Meeting this year, special attention was paid to this problem, especially as the emergency might limit the progress of their development as a result of shortages of capital equipment. Accordingly, the Foreign Ministers very wisely provided in Resolutions XII and XVI for certain orders of priority to which available capital equipment should be devoted in development projects. It seems to the delegation of the United States that governments might devote increased attention to translating these priority schedules into more specific terms, particularly as they relate to their respective needs and possibilities. It would be helpful if the Council from time to time could be provided with reports indicating the progress they are making.

We all realize that the problem of purchasing power of monetary reserves is closely related to the problem of economic development. To the extent that countries can plan during the period of materials shortages the most effective postemergency utilization of their accumulated reserves, they will be able to make the most effective use of those reserves when they can again convert them without difficulty into capital equipment. Therefore, we believe that the Council should stand ready at any time to study with member governments the best means of projecting their development plans into the postemergency period in conjunction with studies of the most efficient utilization of their accumulated reserves.

#### **Transportation**

This Conference has already done most constructive work in regard to the emergency aspects of transportation. Any work program for the ensuing year will, of course, include important continuing duties on the part of the Council in the field of transportation.

While the urgent need at this time is for a technical study of the hemisphere's civil air and maritime transportation requirements, the Council also has an important task to do for its member governments in the long-range field of overland transportation, particularly in regard to the construction of roads, both national and international. For many years the peoples of this hemisphere have had before them the ideal of nations closely interlocked by overland roads. Considerable progress has been made and is being made on the inter-American highway through Central America and on the Pan American Highway in South America. Resolution XIII of the Foreign Ministers Conference refers to the need of improving transportation in regard to the development and delivery of strategic materials. This is a worthy objective during the emergency period which could be translated into broader fields over the long term when the limitations imposed by emergency shortages come to an end. We believe that it might be considered here how the Council could act as a stimulant in working toward the inevitable and essential overland interchange between the nations of the hemisphere.

As this interchange increases there will arise concomitant problems of customs inspection, travel permits for both vehicles and passengers, et cetera. Much work has been done in the last few years in Europe in making studies and recommendations for the facilitation of international travel with the result that vehicles and freight are now able to move internationally in western Europe with a minimum of obstruction at national frontiers. We note with satisfaction that the Pan American Union is already hard at work on a solution of these problems.

#### **Economic and Social Cooperation**

This Conference has afforded a constructive opportunity for reviewing and reassessing the technical cooperation program of the Organization of American States which has already become a significant part of our mutual cooperative efforts. Particular attention has been devoted during our deliberations here to the need for governments to contribute with regularity their share of the budget for the program. It is hoped that the emphasis placed upon this subject here will have continuing results. Emphasis has also been placed upon the need of coordination in the administra-

tion of the program. This extends of course to coordination with programs carried on by other agencies than the Organization of American States.

The need of coordination between the work of this and other agencies applies to other fields than technical cooperation. At the recent meeting in Mexico of the Economic Commission for Latin America of the United Nations, considerable attention was given to the need of preventing duplication between the work of this Council and of ECLA. All of the nations here represented are deeply devoted to the work of ECLA and it has proved itself to be an agency which can do great good for the development of the countries of the hemisphere. It is important that the Council coordinate its work with that of ECLA in order to render most effective their complementary activities.

The U.S. delegation has tried in this brief exposition to set forth some ideas as to how not only in the ensuing fiscal year, but in the future years, the Council can play an increasingly constructive role in the strengthening of the economies of the individual countries of the hemisphere and in binding them closer together as friends and neighbors which can make ever greater contributions to the welfare of each other and to the whole community. There is one aspect of the work of the Council which is more intangible but which may be of even greater value than that of any specific solutions of problems which its work may afford. I refer to the opportunity which the existence of the Council affords for representatives of the governments in Washington in permanent session to meet together and discuss their mutual problems. The work of the ordinary sessions is complemented yearly by the extraordinary session where special delegations from each of the countries meet to discuss, on a ministerial level, problems of a mutual importance. The faith of the U.S. Government in the Council and its work has been demonstrated by the fact that we have detached from their duties in Washington some 14 delegates and advisers representing 8 agencies of the Government which constitute all of the agencies concerned with the work of this session.

I am speaking for our entire delegation when I say that all of us have derived particular benefit and pleasure from the opportunities that we have had of discussing informally, without colleagues, not only problems on our agenda here but other problems in our mutual economic relations. It is a source of gratification to us that at the first and second extraordinary sessions of the Council other nations have sent delegations of distinction. The work of the Council, its standing in the inter-American community, and its positive contribution to the welfare of the community of nations will best be served if the governments participate with increasing interest and vigor in the regular

work of the Council in Washington and future extraordinary sessions. In this connection I should like to pay tribute to the devoted work of the two outstanding men who have served as President of the Council since the last extraordinary session, Don Julio Ernesto Heurtematte of Panama and Don Jorge Mejia-Palacio of Colombia, and to the latter's outstanding address at the opening session which did so much to guide our labors.

In conclusion, since I am required to leave before the end of the session and may not again have an opportunity of addressing the Council, I should like to render tribute on behalf of my delegation to the Government of Panama for its magnificent hospitality, to Carmen Miro for the splendid manner in which she is discharging her responsibilities as Secretary General, and especially to Señor Dr. Galileo Solis, Minister of Finance of the Republic of Panama, and president of this extraordinary session, who has so greatly contributed to the work of the session since its inception.

#### The United States in the United Nations

A weekly feature, does not appear in this issue, but will be resumed in the issue of September 24.

#### Check List of Department Press Releases: Sept. 3-9, 1951

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Number	Date	Subject
760	8/24	Pakistan Locust Plague
775†	8/28	German Doc., vol. 4, released
782†		OEEC European Production
783†	8/31	Awards to U.S. Films
792†	8/31	Germany Signs Torquay Protocol
795*	9/4	Foreign Service Changes
796*	9/4	Exchange of Persons
797†	9/5	Telephone Story at Oatis Trial
798*	9/5	Foreign Service Changes
799†	9/5	World Tobacco Conf.
800	9/6	Azores Defense Agreement
801*	9/6	Exchange of Persons
802*	9/7	Congratulations to New King of Jordan
803*	9/7	Anniversary of Brazil
804	9/7	Ethiopia Signs Economic Treaty
805†	9/7	Legal Committee of ICAO
806*	9/7	Exchange of Persons
807†	9/7	Inter-American Cultural Council
808†	9/7	Venezuelan Petroleum Convention

\*Not printed in BULLETIN.

†Held for future issue of BULLETIN.



## Egypt Asked To End Restrictions on Shipping Through Suez Canal to Israel Ports

### *Text of Security Council Resolution*<sup>1</sup>

U.N. doc. S/2322  
Adopted Sept. 1, 1951

#### The Security Council

1. *Recalling* that in its resolution of 11 August 1949, (S/1376) relating to the conclusion of Armistice Agreements between Israel and the neighbouring Arab States it drew attention to the pledges in these Agreements "against any further acts of hostility between the Parties";

2. *Recalling* further that in its resolution of 17 November 1950 (S/1907) it reminded the States concerned that the Armistice Agreements to which they were parties contemplated "the return of permanent peace in Palestine", and therefore urged them and the other States in the area to take all such steps as would lead to the settlement of the issues between them;

3. *Noting* the report of the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization to the Security Council of 12 June 1951 (S/2194);

4. *Further noting* that the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization recalled the statement of the senior Egyptian delegate in Rhodes on 13 January 1949, to the effect that his delegation was "inspired with every spirit of co-operation, conciliation and a sincere desire to restore peace in Palestine", and that the Egyptian Government has not complied with the earnest plea of the Chief of Staff made to the Egyptian delegate on 12 June 1951, that it desist from the present practice of interfering with the passage through the Suez Canal of goods destined for Israel;

5. *Considering* that since the Armistice regime, which has been in existence for nearly two and a half years, is of a permanent character, neither party can reasonably assert that it is actively a belligerent or requires to exercise the right of visit, search, and seizure for any legitimate purpose of self-defence;

6. *Finds* that the maintenance of the practice mentioned in paragraph 4 above is inconsistent with the objectives of a peaceful settlement between the parties and the establishment of a permanent peace in Palestine set forth in the Armistice Agreement;

7. *Finds further* that such practice is an abuse of the exercise of the right of visit, search and seizure;

8. *Further finds* that that practice cannot in the prevailing circumstances be justified on the ground that it is necessary for self-defence;

9. *And further noting* that the restrictions on the passage of goods through the Suez Canal to Israel ports are denying to nations at no time connected with the conflict in Palestine valuable supplies required for their economic reconstruction, and that these restrictions together with sanctions applied by Egypt to certain ships which have visited Israel ports represent unjustified interference with the rights of nations to navigate the seas and to trade freely with one another, including the Arab States and Israel;

<sup>1</sup> Adopted by a vote of 8 to 0, with the Soviet Union, China, and India abstaining. This resolution was finally adopted by the Security Council was based on a draft submitted by the United States, France, and the United Kingdom on Aug. 15 (S/2298/Rev. 1).

10. *Calls upon* Egypt to terminate the restrictions on the passage of international commercial shipping and goods through the Suez Canal wherever bound and to cease all interference with such shipping beyond that essential to the safety of shipping in the Canal itself and to the observance of the international conventions in force.

## Armistice Negotiations in Korea

### **Message from the U.N. Commander to the Communist Commanders**

*Following is text of message from Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, Allied Supreme Commander, to Gen. Kim Il Song, Supreme Commander of Korean People's Army and Gen. Peng Teh-huai, Commander of Chinese People's Volunteers, broadcast at 12:30 p. m., September 6 [10:30 p. m., September 5, eastern daylight time]*

Your message to me, dated 1 September, 1951, and received 2 September, is yet another of your false charges in which, without the slightest basis in fact, you have again impugned the good faith of the United Nations forces. The charges you have levied in these alleged incidents are baseless and intentionally false. I have stated, and will again positively state, that our thorough investigations have indicated no instances where forces under my command have violated any of the agreements made by me or my representatives. Therefore, if the incidents did, in fact, occur, they were presumably initiated and perpetrated by your forces in order to provide spurious evidence for false and malevolent accusations against the United Nations command.

I cannot provide you with guarantees against your own failure to exercise control in an area for which you are responsible. I cannot prevent the occurrence of incidents deliberately and maliciously manufactured by your forces in an area under your control. I previously guaranteed that our forces would not violate the terms of the agreement concerning Kaesong neutral zone. My forces have scrupulously observed the terms of that agreement. My guarantee remains effective.

That you should permit the forces of your side to indulge in their constant deceit and invective is incomprehensible, unless you have the ulterior motive of completely breaking off negotiations with the further scurrilous accusation that the blame therefore rests upon the United Nations command rather than upon you.

In the interest of the millions of people in the United Nations whom I represent as the commander of their forces in the field, I call upon you to cease these despicable practices which have received world-wide condemnation.

These military armistice discussions at Kaesong have been in progress seven weeks. You must share my concern over the lack of progress achieved.

I have repeatedly emphasized that my principal concern is to achieve a just and honorable military armistice. Events of the past weeks have made it plainly evident to me and to the world at large that further use of the present conference site at Kaesong will inevitably result in additional interruptions of our armistice talks and further delays in reaching agreement. When you decide to terminate the suspension of armistice negotiations which you declared on 23 August, I propose that our liaison officers meet immediately at the bridge at Panmunjom to discuss the selection of a new site where negotiations can be continued without interruptions.

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